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INTRODUCTION

In Younger v. Harris,' the Supreme Court created a justification for federal courts to dismiss claims over which they had jurisdiction,2 but, for reasons of "Our Federalism," believed were better
left to state courts to decide. 3 Since Younger, much scholarship has
been devoted to the development of the various abstention doctrines.' Less, however, has been written about the unique role Chief
Justice Rehnquist has played in extending the federalism component of Younger abstention to situations not contemplated by the
Younger decision itself.5 As applied to civil rights plaintiffs, 6 this ex1. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
2. See Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., 477 U.S. 619, 626 (1986)
(holding that abstention applies not from the district court's lack of jurisdiction, but from
strong policies counseling against the exercise of such jurisdiction where particular state
proceedings have already been commenced).
There are a number ofjudicially created abstention doctrines, each deriving its name
from the case which announced the particular rationale on which the new type of abstention was applied: Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800
(1976); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959); Burford v.
Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); Railroad Conm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
With the exception of Burford abstention, the critical difference between Younger abstention and these other types is that under Younger, a plaintiffs claim is dismissed from federal court, whereas under the other abstention doctrines, the claim is stayed pending
state court resolution of a particular issue or issues.
3. 401 U.S. at 44. Writing for the Court, Justice Black held that "Our Federalism"
encompassed the idea of"comity," which he described as
a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire
country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance
of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their
institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.
Id.
The concept of "Our Federalism" required "sensitivity to the legitimate interests of
both State and National Governments," and required that the national government vindicate federal rights and interests "in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States." Id For an extensive discussion of Younger, see infra part HL
4. For an extensive listing of abstention literature, see 17A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4241 n.1 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1993). For literature specifically on Younger abstention, see id. at nn.16 & 39.
5. During his tenure on the Court, Rehnquist has authored six major decisions traditionally seen as extending the scope of Younger abstention. See Huffman v. Pursue,
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pansion of federalism has, in effect, created a new doctrine of "civil
rights" abstention: a doctrine which elevates the original notion of
"Our Federalism," as found in Younger, to a point where it may be
used to defy precedent, 7 legislative history,8 and statutory language
to exclude civil rights litigants from the federal forum which Congress and the courts have expressly guaranteed to such plaintiffs.'
Civil rights abstention is distinct from Younger abstention in that it
is not subject to the same restrictions as Younger abstention, and it
is not based upon equity jurisprudence, as was Younger, at least in
part. 10 Civil rights abstention is characterized by three elements:
(1) reliance on the notions of comity and "Our Federalism" to expand
the applicability of abstention to a larger class of federal cases;
(2) removal of the Younger restrictions which limited use of federal
abstention; and (3) abrogation of the Congressional grant of access
to federal courts for civil rights plaintiffs by applying the doctrine of
civil rights abstention, rather than following the jurisdictional mandate of 28 U.S.C. § 1343.
One of the obstacles to this type of analysis is the fact that both
the Court and its commentators have continued to characterize what
I call civil rights abstention as Younger abstention, or increasingly,
Younger-Huffman" abstention.'2 Authors continue to criticize the
Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975) (extending Younger to civil proceedings); Doran v. Salem Inn,
Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975) (extending Younger to criminal proceedings filed after the initiation of federal proceedings); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (extending Younger to
civil actions not based on criminal statutes); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979)
(extending Younger to civil actions where numerous proceedings may be required to vindicate rights); Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981)
(extending Younger to actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 even though state judicial
proceedings were not pending); Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., 477
U.S. 619 (1986) (extending Younger abstention when administrative proceedings were
pending, as opposed to state judicial proceedings).
Rehnquist voted with the majority in four other major decisions extending Younger.
See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975) (extending Younger to a state action initiated
after a federal action); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (extending Younger to
civil proceedings brought by the state); Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State
Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982) (extending Younger to state administrative proceedings);
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987) (extending Younger to cases involving private parties).
6. For purposes of this Comment, the term "civil rights plaintiff" refers to any plaintiff attempting to litigate a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal court.
7. See infra part I.B.
8. See infra part I.A.
9. Abstention doctrine conflicts with 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1988), which is the jurisdictional counterpart to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Both sections are set forth infra note 18.
10. See infra text accompanying note 91.
11. The reference is to the case of Huffiman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975),
which is discussed infra notes 124-50 and accompanying text. Huffman extended the Younger
holding to civil proceedings, and in doing so, created the doctrine of civil rights abstention.
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courts for unwarranted or impermissible extensions of the Younger
doctrine,"3 without recognizing that what they characterize as extensions are in reality transgressions of Younger. My purpose in focusing on the distinctiveness of civil rights abstention is tvo-fold.
First, by removing the Younger pretense from abstention doctrine
development, it is possible to expose civil rights abstention for what
it is: an attempt at relieving the courts of unwanted civil claims. 4
12. See Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., 477 U.S. 619, 628
(1986); Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 112 (1981); Moore
v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 339 (1977); Timothy Kiw
Lee Hui, The Ultimate Expansion of the Younger Doctrine:Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 41
Sw. L.J. 1055, 1062 (1987) (discussing the Court's use of "principles that Huffman and
Younger had developed"); George Sheram King, Comment, Federal Injunctive Relief
Against Pending State Civil Proceedings:Younger Days are Here Again, 44 LA. L. REV.
967, 973 (1982) (discussing the "Younger-Huffman" doctrine); Stephen Jon Moss, Comment, PennzoiL-A Merger of FederalAbstention, 13 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 607, 616 (1988)
(stating that the "dictates of federalism and comity enunciated by Younger and Huffman
required abstention").
13. See Rex E. Lee & Richard G. Wilkins, An Analysis of Supplemental Jurisdiction
and Abstention with Recommendations for Legislative Action, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 321,
375 (1990) ("The recent expansion of Younger to state administrative and civil proceedings undermines the federal judiciary's primary role as the protector of federal rights.");
Jack M. Beermann, Government Official Torts and the Takings Clause: Federalismand
State Sovereign Immunity, 68 B.U. L. REV. 277, 346 (1988) ("Later expansions of the
Younger doctrine have been unfriendly to the idea that a federal hearing ought ultimately
to be available."); Jeff Powell, The Compleat Jeffersonian:Justice Rehnquist and Federalism, 91 YALE L.J. 1317, 1337 (1982) (characterizing Rehnquist's decision in Rizzo v. Goode
as a "startling expansion of 'Our Federalism'"); Daan Braveman, Fair Assessment and
FederalJurisdictionin Civil Rights Cases, 45 PITT. L. REV. 351, 378 n.187 (1984) (stating
that the unjustified expansion of Younger represents "a radical departure from the practice of federal courts" (citation omitted)).
14. Chief Justice Rehnquist has expressed his desire that Congress limit access to
federal courts because the system is overloaded. Rehnquist told members of the American
Bar Association that "[w]e must think not about creating new federal causes of action, but
of remitting to state courts some of the business now handled by federal courts." Stacey
Adler, Limit FederalSuits: Rehnquist, Bus. INS., Feb. 13, 1989, at 32. The notion that the
Rehnquist Court has restricted access to federal courts has been suggested in both scholarly and popular publications, as well as in case law. See, e.g., Fair Assessment in Real
Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 125 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in Rehnquist's
judgment) ("The power to control the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts is assigned
by the Constitution to Congress, not to this Court. In its haste to rid the federal courts of
a class of cases that it thinks unfit for federal scrutiny, the Court... departs from this
fundamental precept"); Ann Althouse, Tapping the State Court Resource, 44 VAND. L.
REV. 953, 957 (1991) ("Many legal scholars believe that ... the Burger-Rehnquist Courts
have restricted access to federal courts to cut back on [claims of rights violations] .... "
(citation omitted)); Richard A. Matasar, Treatise Writing and Federal JurisdictionScholarship:Does Doctrine Matter When Law is Politics?, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1499, 1507 (1991)
(reviewing ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION (1989)) (discussing Chemerinsky's view that the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have limited access to federal courts);
Fred Barbash, Rehnquist Utterly Consistent in Conservative Votes and Opinions, WASH.
POST, June 18, 1986, at Al ("Rehnquist has worked to limit access to the federal courts
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Second, civil rights abstention analysis exposes the conflict between
the congressional grant ofjurisdiction to federal courts in civil rights
cases, and the Supreme Court's heretofore successful circumvention
of that grant. This Comment will first show how Congress, through
the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, sought to give civil
rights litigants an opportunity to litigate federal rights in a federal
forum. Included in this discussion is a survey of modern case law,
which has acknowledged the right to a federal forum for civil rights
litigants. Part I examines the origins of "Our Federalism" as enun15 and analyzes the scope of that concept
ciated in Younger v. Harris
as delineated in the decision. This part also outlines the development of the Younger doctrine prior to the creation of civil rights abstention. Part III begins with an analysis of Huffman v. Pursue,
Ltd.,1 the case which first applied civil rights abstention. This part
critically examines Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinions which have
expanded the scope of civil rights abstention. Through a case by case
analysis, this part exposes the differences that exist between civil
rights abstention and Younger abstention. Particular emphasis is
placed on the erosion of Younger's restrictions on the use of abstention. Part IV discusses in detail Rehnquist's 1981 opinion in Fair
Assessment in Real Estate Association v. McNary, 7 which not only
embodied every major development in civil rights abstention to that
time, but extended the scope of civil rights abstention as well.
Through a comparative analysis of FairAssessment and Younger,
this part highlights the differences in civil rights abstention and
Younger abstention, both in terms of the rationale and justification
for the doctrines, and in the application of the doctrine to civil rights
litigants. Finally, Part V of this Comment discusses the further development of civil rights abstention. This part analyzes three cases
in which the Court expanded the application of civil rights abstention to
bar civil rights litigants from litigating their claims in federal courts.
I. THE RIGHT TO A FEDERAL FORUM
A.

Legislative History
Before one can appreciate the significance of civil rights ab-

for those who object to" allowing "religious exercises in public schools, . . . state aid to parochial schools and... nativity scenes in city parks."); The Court's Deaf Ear, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, June 17, 1992, at A14 ("[Tihe high court of William H. Rehnquist has
limited citizens' access to federal courts in ways that create a dangerous imbalance in
power. If people can't turn to their courts to make the government follow the law, then
where can they turn?").
15. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
16. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
17. 454 U.S. 100 (1981).
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stention, one must understand the substantive rights Congress intended to afford United States citizens involved in civil rights cases,
as well as the procedural mechanisms Congress provided for enforcing those rights. Sections 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 28 U.S.C. 1343 respectively establish such rights.' 8 In order to fully understand those
sections, it is necessary to determine what Congress meant by enacting those statutes. This can be done by looking to the legislative
history of the acts, a practice in which courts often engage. 9 Indeed,
the Supreme Court has done this on a number of occasions with respect to § 198320 and there is a wealth of legislative history surrounding § 1983's predecessor, Section One of the Civil Rights Act of
1871, on which to draw. Section One of that Act created a private
right of action against persons who, under color of state law, had deprived an individual of his federal rights, and gave federal courts
jurisdiction to hear such cases. 21 It is clear from the floor debates
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
28 U.S.C. § 1343 provides in relevant part:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or
immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any
Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons
within the jurisdiction of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1988).
19. In Patsy v. Board of Regents, the Court stated: "[Liegislative purpose.., is of
paramount importance... because Congress is vested with the power to prescribe the
basic procedural scheme under which claims may be heard in federal courts.... [A] court
should not defer the exercise of jurisdiction under a federal statute unless it is consistent
with that intent." 457 U.S. 496, 501-02 (1982).
20. See infra part I.B.
21. The language of Section One, as adopted by Congress read:
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representativesof the UnitedStates
of America in Congress assembled, That any person who, under color of any law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or
cause to be subjected, any person within the jurisdiction of the United States to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States, shall, any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage of the State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress; such proceeding to be prosecuted in the several district or circuitcourts
of the United States, with and subject to the same rights of appeal, review upon
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surrounding the Act that Congress not only intended to create a federal forum for such actions, but that both the supporters and the opponents of the amendment expected the federal courts to be the primary forum in which the newly created cause of action would be litigated.22 Of those who supported the Act many spoke of the nature of
the rights being protected, and the federal mechanism to enforce
those rights. In support of the Act, Senator Frelinghuysen of New
Jersey stated:
[S]ince the fourteenth amendment forbids any State from making or enforcing any law abridging these privileges and immunities... the injured
party should have an original action in our Federal courts, so that by inthe
junction or by the recovery of damages he could have relief against
23
party who under color of such law is guilty of infringing his rights.

Representative Lowe of Kansas in support of the Act remarked:
[R]ecords of the public tribunals are searched in vain for any evidence of
effective redress [of federally secured rights].
The case has arisen.., when the Federal Government must resort
to its own agencies to carry its own authority into execution. Hence this
bill throws open the doors of the United States courts to those whose
rights under the Constitution are denied or impaired. 24

Many Congressmen spoke of the need for a federal forum as a
error, and other remedies provided in like cases in such courts, under the provisions of the act of the ninth of April, eighteen hundred and sixty-six, entitled

"An Act to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and to
furnish the means of their vindication"; and the other remedial laws of the

United States which are in their nature applicable to such cases.
Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1988)) (second emphasis added).
For an extensive analysis of the legislative histories of the Civil Rights Acts of the
Reconstruction Era, see Donald H. Zeigler, A Reassessment of the Younger Doctrine in
Light of the Legislative History of Reconstruction, 1983 DUKE L.J. 987 (1983). For Professor Zeigler's discussion of the legislative history of the 1871 Act, see id. at 1011.
22. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979) ("There is no question that both
the supporters and opponents of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 believed that the Act ceded
to the Federal Government many important powers that previously had been considered
to be within the exclusive province of the individual States." (footnote omitted)). Quern
concerned the applicability of § 1983 to states in light of the Eleventh Amendment. After
examining the legislative history of § 1983, Rehnquist, writing for the Court, held that
Congress did not intend states to be incorporated into the language of § 1983. This is a
rare example of Rehnquist's use of the legislative history of § 1983 when ruling on a procedural matter. Notably, the legislative history is invoked to support a limiting interpretation of the scope of § 1983 with respect to whom the section may reach. Rehnquist has
cited legislative history only once in his decisions to date on abstention. See Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 109-10 (1981).
23. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 501 (1871).
24. Id. at 374-76.
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result of deficiencies at the state court level in protecting the rights
of minorities. Senator Osborn of Florida stated:
If the State courts had proven themselves competent to... maintain law
and order, we should not have been called upon to legislate .... We are
driven by existing facts to provide for the several States in the South what
they have been unable fully to provide for themselves; i.e., the full and
complete administration of justice in the courts. And the courts with reference to which we legislate must be the United States courts. 25

Arguing in support of the Act, Representative Coburn of Indiana
remarked:
[T]he courts ofjustice of the nation stand with open doors, ready to receive
and hear with impartial attention the complaints of those who are denied
redress elsewhere.
The United States courts are further above mere local influence
than the county courts; their judges can act with more independence... ;
their sympathies are not so nearly identified with those of the vicinage;
the jurors are taken from the State, and not the neighborhood; they will be
able to rise above prejudices or bad passions or terror more easily.... We
believe that we can trust our United States courts, and we propose to do
26
SO.

Senator Morton of Indiana commented:
But it is said ... the matter should be left with the States. The answer to
that is, that.., the States do not protect the rights of the people; the
State courts are powerless to redress these wrongs. The great fact remains
that large classes of people.., are without legal remedies in the courts of
27
the States.
Still others emphasized the unique nature of the rights Congress had created, and why the federal courts were best suited to

protecting those rights. Representative Dawes of Massachusetts
stated:

The first remedy proposed by this bill is a resort to the courts of the
United States.... IT]here is no tribunal so fitted, where equal and exact
justice would be more likely to be meted out in temper, in moderation, in
severity, if need be, but always according to the law and the fact, as that
great tribunal of the Constitution.28

Representative Elliott of South Carolina stated:
[Tihe Government of the United States [has] the right, under the Consti25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 653.
Id. at 459-60.
Id. app. at 252.
Id. at 476.
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tution, to protect a citizen of the United States in the exercise of his vested
rights as an American citizen by... the assertionof immediatejurisdiction
through its courts, without the appeal or agency of the State in which the
citizen is domiciled.29
Of course, there were a number of speakers who opposed the

Act. Ironically, in many instances, it is their comments that go fur-

ther in portraying the Act as one that would allow wholesale access
to federal court, without respect to the extent of injury suffered, or
the amount of damages sought. Representative Kerr of Indiana, who
opposed the Act, commented: "This section gives to any person who
may have been injured in any of his rights, privileges, or immunities

of person or property, a civil action for damages against the wrongdoer in the Federal courts." 0 Representative Biggs of Delaware remarked in opposition: "[F]or the violation of the rights, privileges,
and immunities of the citizen a civil remedy is to be had by proceedings in Federal courts .... ."1 Senator Thurman of Ohio, who also

opposed the Act, stated:
It authorizes any person who is deprived of any right, privilege, or immunity secured to him by the Constitution of the United States, to bring an
action against the wrong-doer in the Federal courts, and that without any
limit whatsoever as to the amount in controversy.... [B]y this section jurisdiction of that civil action is given to the Federal courts instead of its
being prosecuted as now in the courts of the States....
*.. I object to [Section One], first, because of the centralizing tendency
of transferring all mere private suits, as well as the punishment of offenses, from the State into the Federal courts. I do not say that this section gives to the Federal courts exclusive jurisdiction.... It leaves it, I
presume, in the option of the person who imagines himself to be injured to
sue in the State court or in the Federal court, an option that he who has
been the least injured, but who
has some malice to gratify, will be the
32
most likely to avail himself of.

As illustrated in the above statement, many of the Congressmen were concerned with the federal encroachment on what they
perceived to be areas of State concern. Representative Voorhees of
29. Id. at 389 (emphasis added).
30. Id. app. at 50.
31. Id. at 416
32. Id. app. at 216. Senator Thurman also suggested that the Act impugned the integrity of the state courts:
[WIhatever may be said about [the 1871 Act], [it is] a disparagement of the
State courts.... [To say that every man who may be injured, however slightly,
in his rights, privileges, or immunities as a citizen of the United States can go
to the Federal courts for redress is to say, in effect, that the judiciary of the
States is not worthy of being trusted.
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Indiana feared that "[tihe first and second sections [were] designed
to transfer all criminal jurisdiction from the courts of the States to
the courts of the United States."33 Representative Storm of Pennsylvania also was concerned that
[Section One] does not even give the State courts a chance to try questions, or to show whether they will try the questions that might come beor
fore them under the first section of the fourteenth amendment, fairly
4
not. It takes the whole question away from them in the beginning.3
The legislative history is clear: Congress intended, and fully expected, that the federal courts would be the primary guarantors of
federal rights.

B.

Modern Case Law

Consistent with this statutory grant, modern case law also has
acknowledged the right of a civil rights plaintiff to proceed in a federal forum 5 Both pre-Younger and post-Younger cases have construed actions under § 1983 to be free from State exhaustion requirements, 6 immune from the Anti-Injunction Act, 37 and in general, properly litigated in federal courts.3 8 The leading pre-Younger
case is Monroe v. Pape.39 In that case, the Court reviewed much of
the legislative history, and concluded that the language of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, the predecessor of § 1983, combined with the remarks of those voting on the Act, was sufficient to establish that indeed Congress did intend to provide a federal forum for civil rights

33. Id. app. at 179.
34. Id. app. at 86.
35. There is also a significant body of older case law supporting the right of access to
federal courts. See, e.g., Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40 (1909) ("The
right of a party plaintiff to choose a Federal court where there is a choice cannot be properly denied."); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 383 (1821) ("The Constitution
gave to every person having a claim upon a State, a right to submit his case to the Court
of the nation.").
36. Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
37. Mitchumn v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
38. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
39. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled on other grounds by Monell v.
Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The Monroe family brought an action
against Chicago and 13 of its police officers for violation of their Fourteenth Amendment
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint alleged that the 13 police officers, without
warrants, broke into the Monroes' home, forced them to stand naked in the living room
while they ransacked the entire house, and took Mr. Monroe to the police station. It was
further alleged that Mr. Monroe was detained there for 10 hours on "open" charges, interrogated about a murder, not taken before a magistrate or permitted to phone his family
or an attorney, and subsequently released without charges. The district court dismissed
the complaint, and the court of appeals affirmed. Id. at 169-70.
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litigants. 40 Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas 41 concluded: 'The
[Civil Rights Act of 18711-in particular [Section One] with which
we are now concerned-had several purposes....

[One of the

purposes] was to provide a federal remedy where the state remedy,
42
though adequate in theory, was not available in practice."
According to Douglas, the debates clearly illustrated that
one reason the legislation was passed was to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or
otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to
by the
the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed
43
Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the state agencies.

This portion of Monroe was affirmed two years later in McNeese
v. Board of Education.' In McNeese, a suit was brought by black

students against the school board for maintaining a segregated
school district in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution. In holding for the students, Justice Douglas announced that federal civil rights claims were entitled to be litigated
in federal courts. 45 "It is immaterial whether respondents' conduct
[was] legal or illegal as a matter of state law. Such [civil rights]
claims [were] entitled to be adjudicated in the federal courts."46
In Zwickler v. Koota,47 the Court emphatically discussed the
duty of federal courts to hear civil rights cases:
Congress imposed the duty upon all levels of the federal judiciary to give
40. Id. at 180.
41. Justice Douglas consistently argued for the right of access to federal courts. He
voted with the majority in several opinions affirming this right. See Steffel v. Thompson,
415 U.S. 452 (1974); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972); Lynch v. Household Fin.,
405 U.S. 538 (1972); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967); McNeese v. Board of Educ.,
373 U.S. 668 (1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled on other grounds by
Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Douglas also voiced this
opinion in numerous dissents. See Boebning v. Indiana State Employers Ass'n, 423 U.S.
6, 8 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 934 (1975)
(Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 353 (1975) (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas, J.); Huffman
v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 618 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Harris County Cornm'rs v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 89 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37, 58 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 179 (1959)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). Douglas was as consistent on abstention as Rehnquist has been,
albeit on the other side of the issue.
42. 365 U.S. at 173-74.
43. Id. at 180.
44. 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
45. Id. at 674.
46. Id. (citations omitted). Earlier in the opinion, Douglas noted that "[tihe First
Congress created federal courts as the chief-though not always the exclusive-tribunals
for enforcement of federal rights." Id. at 672.
47. 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
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due respect to a suitor's choice of a federal forum for the hearing and decision of his federal constitutional claims. Plainly, escape from that duty is
not permissible merely because state courts also have the solemn responsibility, equally with the federal courts, "... . to guard, enforce, and protect
every right granted or secured by the Constitution of the United
States ....

"48

Even after the Younger decision, the Court continued to recognize the right of a civil rights plaintiff acting under federal law to
access federal court. Only one year after Younger, in Lynch v.
Household Finance,49 Justice Stewart, writing on the subject of the
plaintiffs choice of forum, stated: "[Tihe Congress that enacted the
predecessor of §§ 1983 and 1343(3) seems clearly to have intended to
provide a federal judicial forum for the redress of wrongful deprivations of property by persons acting under color of state law."50 The
decision in Mitchum v. Foster,1 decided two months after Lynch, recounted the relevant legislative history of § 1983, and used broad
language in affirming the federal forum guarantee. "It is clear from
the legislative debates surrounding passage of § 1983's predecessor
that the Act was intended to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment 'against state action,... whether that action be
executive, legislative, orjudicial.' "'2The Court found that
[The Act of 18711 was thus an important part of the basic alteration in our
federal system .... As a result of the new structure... the role of the
Federal Government as a guarantor of basic federal rights against state
power was clearly established. Section 1983 opened the federal courts to
private citizens, offering a uniquely federal remedy against incursions under the claimed authority of state53law upon rights secured by the Constitution and the laws of the Nation.

It is importanat to recognize that the Civil Rights Acts of 1871
was intended to change the then-existing federal-state relationship.
The Younger Court missed this point when it emphasized that the
48. Id. at 248 (citations omitted). The Court also stated:
"We yet like to believe that wherever the Federal courts sit, human rights under the Federal Constitution are always a proper subject for adjudication, and
that we have not the right to decline the exercise of that jurisdiction simply because the rights asserted may be adjudicated in some other forum."
Id. (quoting Stapelton v. Mitchell, 60 F. Supp. 51, 55 (D. Kan. 1945)).
49. 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
50. Id. at 543.
51. 407 U.S. 225 (1972). For a discussion ofMitchum, see infra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
52. 407 U.S. at 240 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 339, 346 (1879). It
is significant that Justice Stewart included action by any branch of state government.
Rehnquist subsequently indicated that deference should be afforded to state executive
actions. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
53. 407 U.S. at 238-39 (citations and footnote omitted).
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policy of non-interference with state interests, or "Our Federalism,"
that the Court was endorsing was based on a choice by Congress
made after the "profound debates that ushered our Federal
Constitution into existence".' "It should never be forgotten that 'Our
Federalism,' born in the early struggling days of our Union of States,
occupies a highly important place in our nation's history and its
future."55 However, it was the failure of that relationship to ensure
56
federal rights that led to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act.
Indeed, the Civil Rights Act was precisely intended to change that
relationship, and allow the federal courts to act directly to vindicate
federal rights. In his dissent in Younger, Justice Douglas
immediately seized upon the majority's failure to apprehend this
point, stating:
There is no more good reason for allowing a general statute dealing with
federalism passed at the end of the 18th century to control another statute
passed also dealing with federalism, almost 80 years later, than to conthat the early concepts of federalism were not changed by the Civil
clude 57
War.

The Mitchum Court recognized this distinction, explaining:
The very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between
the States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights ....
In carrying out that purpose, Congress plainly authorized the federal
courts to issue injunctions in § 1983 actions,58 by expressly authorizing a
'suit in equity' as one of the means of redress.

Two years later in Steffel v. Thompson, 9 the Court summarized
the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and the Judiciary Act of 1875,60 stating:
"'IT]he lower federal courts... became the primary and powerful
the Constitution, the
reliances for vindicating every right given by
61
laws, and the treaties of the United States.'"
54. 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).

55. Id. at 44-45.
56. See supra notes 25, 42-43 and accompanying text; see also Prieser v. Rodriguez,

411 U.S. 475, 516 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[Section 1983's] legislative history
'makes evident that Congress clearly conceived that it was altering the relationship be-

tween the States and the Nation with respect to the protection of federally created rights;
it was concerned that state instrumentalities could not protect those rights'...." (quoting
litchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972))).

57. 401 U.S. at 62 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
58. 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).
59. 415 U.S. 452 (1974). For further discussion of Steffel, see infra notes 118-22 and
accompanying text.
60. The 1875 Judiciary Act, now codified at 28 U.S.C § 1331 (1988), conferred general federal question jurisdiction on the lower courts subject only to a jurisdictional

amount limitation.
61. 415 U.S. at 464 (quoting FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE

514

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

One of the most extensive restatements of the guaranteed right
to a federal forum appeared in Patsy v. Board of Regents.62 The case
involved the issue of whether or not exhaustion of state administrative remedies prior to commencing an action under § 1983 was required by the statute. 3 In holding that exhaustion was not required,14 the Court examined the legislative history of § 1983 and
cases construing that history, and concluded:
The Civil Rights Act of 1871, along with the Fourteenth Amendment it
was enacted to enforce, were crucial ingredients in the basic alteration of
our federal system accomplished during the Reconstruction Era. During
that time, the Federal Government was clearly established as a guarantor
of the basic federal rights of individuals against incursions by state
power....
*.. [I]n passing § 1 [of the Civil Rights Act of 1871], Congress assigned
to the federal courts a paramount role in protecting constitutional rights. 5

The most recent affirmation of the right to a federal forum
came in Will v. Michigan Department of State Police.6" Will reaf7
that a State is not a person for
firmed the dicta in Quern v. Jordan1
purposes of § 1983.' The Court, however, acknowledged the right to
a federal forum byr adding in no uncertain terms that § 1983 was
created with the intention that civil rights plaintiffs could avoid
state adjudications of their federal civil rights.
Given that a principle purpose behind the enactment of § 1983 was to

provide a federal forum for civil rights claims, and that Congress did not
provide such a federal forum for civil rights claims against States, we canBUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 65 (1928)).

62. 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
63. Id. at 498.
64. While Patsy stands for the proposition that exhaustion is not required under
§ 1983, the decision is severely limited by Rehnquist's opinion in Parratt v. Taylor, 451
U.S. 527 (1981), ouerruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
Parrattrequired civil rights plaintiffs to seek state remedies which, once pursued, are
subject to exhaustion. See infra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
65. 457 U.S. at 503. The Court also interpreted the legislative history to indicate
that Congress had intended the choice of forum to be made at the plaintiffs discretion.
"[Many legislators interpreted the bill to provide dual or concurrent forums in the state
and federal system, enabling the plaintiff to choose the forum in which to seek relief." Id.
at 506.
66. 491 U.S. 58 (1989). Will sued the Michigan Department of State Police and the
Director of State Police under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that he was denied a job promotion in the Department of State Police because his brother had been the subject of a "red
squad" file maintained by the defendants. On appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court held
that neither a state nor a state official acting in his official capacity is a "person" under
§ 1983. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari because the Michigan Supreme
Courts holding conflicted with a number of state and federal court decisions. Id. at 60-61.
67. 440 U.S. 332 (1979). For a discussion of Quern, see supra note 22.
68. 491 U.S. at 64.
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not accept [the] argument that Congress intended nevertheless to create a
cause of action against States to be brought in state courts, which are
precisely the courts Congress sought to allow civil rights claimants to
avoid through § 1983.69

Throughout twenty-six years of jurisprudence, the Supreme

Court has repeatedly held that Congress intended to afford civil
rights litigants a right to federal court adjudication of their federal

civil rights. Much of the same language can be found in concurring
and dissenting opinions during roughly the same period.70 One of the
more noteworthy dissents was Justice Powell's in Maine v. Thiboutot,7 a case concerning the award of attorney's fees in civil rights
cases. In dissenting to that part of the majority's decision which in69. Id. at 66.
70. Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 180 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("From
the time when Congress first implemented the Fourteenth Amendment by the comprehensive Civil Rights Act of 1871 the thought has prevailed that the federal courts are the
unique tribunals which are to be utilized to preserve the civil rights of the people.");
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 63 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("With ... the Act of
1871, Congress sought to [expand] the judicial power. Section 1983 is ... not only an expression of the importance of protecting federal rights from infringement by the states
but also, where necessary, the desire to place the national government between the state
and its citizens.'" (quoting Landry v. Daley, 288 F. Supp. 200, 223 (N.D. Ill. 1968))); Prieser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 513-14 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("By enactment of
the Ku Klux Klan Act in 1871, and again by the grant in 1875 of the original federalquestion jurisdiction to the federal courts, Congress recognized important interests in
permitting a plaintiff to choose a federal forum in cases arising under federal law.");
Huffnan v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 617 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Section
1983 ... and the Judiciary Act of 1875 ... completely altered Congress' pre-Civil War

policy of relying on state courts to vindicate rights arising under the Constitution and
federal laws." (citing Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 245-46 (1967))); Hicks v. Miranda,
422 U.S. 332, 355-56 (1975) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("The statute... 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
established in our law 'the role of the Federal Government as a guarantor of basic federal
rights against state power.'" (quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239 (1972)));
Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 342 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Congress created this
cause of action [§ 1983] over a century ago, and at the same time expressly charged the
federal judicial system with responsibility for the vindication and enforcement of federal
rights under it against unconstitutional action under color of state law... ."); Trainor v.
Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 456 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("When it enacted § 1983,
Congress weighed the competing demands of 'Our Federalism,' and consciously decided to
protect federal rights in the federal forum"); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 108 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Congress [through § 1983] deliberately opened the federal
courts to individual citizens in response to the States' failure to provide justice in their
own courts."); Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 123 (1981)
(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Congress has expressly provided jurisdiction
over... claims [that Constitutional or federal rights have been denied by any state] in
the district courts." (citations omitted)); Pennzoil v. Texaco, 481 U.S. 1, 19 (1987)
(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) ("'The very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose
the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal
rights. . . .'" (citations omitted)).

71. 448 U.S. 1, 11 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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terpreted § 1983 and § 1343 to include statutory claims as well as
constitutional claims, Powell argued that "the right to a federal forum in every case [has been] viewed as a crucial ingredient in the
federal remedy afforded by § 1983. "72 What is notable about this dissent is the fact that Justice Rehnquist joined Powell in this position.
Given Rehnquist's expansion of abstention to defeat civil rights
plaintiffs' access to federal courts, however, it is apparent that Rehnquist has either ignored or internally resolved this inconsistency.
C.

The Need for a FederalForum

The preceding sections of Part I have established that Congress
intended to create a federal forum for the purpose of hearing civil
rights claims, and that the Supreme Court has acknowledged the
right of a civil rights plaintiff to proceed in federal court. Related to
the question of a civil rights plaintiffs right to litigate claims in federal court is whether or not there is a need for the plaintiff to present her claims to a federal court. If, after all, there is no difference
between state and federal adjudication of federal rights, then abstention doctrine poses no threat to a civil rights plaintiff. If, however, there is a disparity in the competencies of the courts, then
there is a threat to the civil rights plaintiff that she will be required,
because of abstention, to litigate in a forum of lesser ability. "Our
Federalism" dictates deference to state courts, not on the basis of the
inherent competency of state courts in resolving issues of federal
law, but out of sensitivity to state interests, and a desire to not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the state.7"
Many commentators believe, however, that there is a disparity
in the abilities of state and federal courts to adjudicate federal
rights.74 According to one commentator: "There is a widespread perception that the forum of litigation may be as outcome-determina72. Id. at 20. Powell added: "Nearly every commentator who has considered the
question has concluded that § 1343(3) was intended to supply federal jurisdiction in all
§ 1983 actions." Id. at 21.
73. See infra note 90; cf Huffinan v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 610-11 (1975)
(recognizing that state judges are bound by an oath to uphold the Constitution).
74. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity,90 HARv. L. REV. 1105, 1106 (1977)
(arguing that the Court's assumption of parity between state and federal courts is an attempt to "weaken disfavored federal constitutional rights by remitting their enforcement
to less receptive state forums"); Donald H. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Ap.
proach to the Enforcement of Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665, 686
(1987) (suggesting that there are often disadvantages to litigating federal constitutional
claims in state rather than federal court, including: state judges who are not uniformly
well-qualified; state judges who lack expertise in federal law; state judges who may be
subject to majoritarian political pressure; and state judges who may be biased in reviewing actions of other state officials) (footnotes omitted).
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tive as the underlying merits."7 ' The reasons for such a belief are
well-documented. From a historical perspective, it is clear that the
Congress which enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871 recognized the
inadequacy of certain state forums in protecting federal rights.7
More recently, the American Law Institute (ALI) concluded that, in
state courts, "[e]rroneous application of federal law may result
either from a misunderstanding as to the law or from a lack of sympathy to it." 77 While the ALI noted that federal judges were subject
to the same failings as state court judges, the study concluded, "that
federal courts are more likely to apply federal law sympathetically
and understandingly than are state courts." 78 This conclusion echoes
admonishment three years earlier in Greenwood v.
Justice Douglas'
79
Peacock:
Prosecution for a federally protected act is punishment for that act. The
cost of proceeding court by court until the federal right is vindicated is
great. Restraint of liberty may be present; the need to post bonds may be
present; the hire of a lawyer may be considerable; the gantlet of state prounsympathetic
ceedings may entail destruction of a federal right through
80
and adverse fact-findings that are in effect unreviewable.

A number of commentators have criticized the Court's creation
of procedural barriers to federal adjudication of federal rights as
diminishing substantive civil rights.8 ' This idea had already been
recognized in 1981 when Senator Charles Mathias introduced The
Civil Rights Improvement Act of 1981,82 a bill designed to amend the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 for the express purpose of overturning certain Supreme Court decisions which had "seriously curtailed access
to Federal courts for civil rights litigants." 3 Senator Mathias ex75. Barry Friedman, A Revisionary Theory of Abstention, 88 MICH. L. REV. 530, 530
(1988) (footnote omitted).
76. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
77. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 166 (1969).
78. Id.
79. 384 U.S. 808 (1966).

80. Id. at 844 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
81. See, e.g., Zeigler, supra note 74, at 666 (arguing that while "the Court has not
diluted the content or substance of rights directly .... it has created procedural barriers
that leave victims without a practical remedy"); Michael Wells, Is Disparity a Problem?,
22 GA. L. REV. 283, 325 (1988) (stating that "virtually everyone now acknowledges, that
the rules of procedure... have a major impact on how the substantive principles of law
operate in practice"). In other words, if you don't know the rules, you can't play the game.
82. S. 990, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
83. 127 Cong. Rec., S7248 (1981) (statement of Sen. Mathias). Of the six decisions
Mathias referred to specifically as "significantly curtailing access to the Federal courts for
those seeking relief under section 1983"--Huffman, Hicks, Rizzo, Trainor, Juidice, and
Moore-Rehnquistauthored four and concurred in the remaining two. Id. at S7249.
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plained that the substantive rights of former state court defendants
to subsequently sue under § 1983 could be obliterated by a bar to
relitigation of matters raised in an earlier state proceeding.8
These examples demonstrate the broad and longstanding concern that federal rights are not adequately protected in state court
proceedings. The Court, commentators, American Law Institute and
Congresses separated by 110 years have all expressed that a federal
forum is necessary to effectively vindicate federal rights.
Not only do civil rights plaintiffs have a right to litigate their
claims in federal court, but in order to ensure expert adjudication of
those claims, they have a need to access the federal forum as well.

II. THE BiRTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF "OUR FEDERALISM"
A.

The Birth of "OurFederalism"

The concept of "Our Federalism" with respect to federal court
abstention was first enunciated by Justice Black in Younger v. Harris.8 5 Younger involved a challenge to a California Criminal Syndicalism Act, which proscribed activity leading to an illegal overthrow
of the government or private industry.' John Harris Jr., who had
been indicted under the Act for distributing leaflets, sought to avoid
the state criminal proceeding by initiating a federal suit seeking injunctive relief from prosecution on the grounds that the statute violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. In dismissing the
suit, the Supreme Court offered two reasons for abstaining in deference to the pending state criminal action. First, the basic doctrine of
equity jurisprudence mandated that courts of equity should not act
to restrain a criminal prosecution when the moving party has an
adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief.' Second, Black then supported this reasoning 9
84. Id. (citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980)). According to Mathias, if a state
court criminal defendant raised constitutional issues in his defense, he would be barred
from bringing a § 1983 claim for an unconstitutional deprivation of rights. Id.
85. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

86. Id. at 38-39. The statute prohibited printing, publishing, editing, issuing, circulating or publicly displaying any book, paper, pamphlet, document, poster or written or
printed matter in any other form, containing or carrying written or printed advocacy,
teaching, or aiding and abetting the commission of a crime "as a means of accomplishing
a change in industrial ownership or control, or effecting any political change." Id. at 39
nn.1 & 3.
87. Id. at 38-39.
88. Id. at 43-44.
89. Id. at 44. Black specifically stated that the equity jurisprudence rationale was
"reinforced" by the "notion of comity." Id. Reinforce is defined: "To give more force or effectiveness to, strengthen, support." AMERICAN HERITAGE DIcTIONARY 1042 (2d College
ed. 1981). When combined with the definition of reinforce, Black's statement might lead
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by asserting that comity and "Our Federalism" also mandated abstention in the situation faced by the Court. 90 Although the Court
did identify and discuss these two distinct lines of reasoning, Black
chose to base the specific holding of the case solely on grounds of
equity jurisprudence. [O]ur holding rests on the absence of the factors necessary under equitable principles to justify federal intervention ... ."91 One factor the Court did not consider was Harris' right to
proceed in federal court under § 1983 and § 1343. As was shown in
Part I, the Court had by the time of this decision already recognized
both the legislative and judicial authority for a civil rights plaintiff
to litigate in federal court. One might conclude that the Younger decision was meant, either implicitly or explicitly, to change the
Court's position on the issue. Such was not the case.92 The Court did
not address the access issue, relying instead on established norms in
applying abstention to state criminal defendants. 3 Traditionally,
one to conclude that the comity rationale was secondary to the equity analysis. Black,
however, confused the issue by stating that the equity rationale was reinforced by "an
even more vital consideration, the notion of 'comity' .... " 401 U.S. at 44 (emphasis
added). That language taken alone could lead to the conclusion that comity was more important to Black than equity. The holding of the case, however, was not based on comity
or federalism, but on equity. See infra text accompanying note 91.
90. 401 U.S. at 44. Justice Black explained his conception of "comity" as
a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire
country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance
of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their
institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate
ways. This, perhaps for lack of a better and clearer way to describe it, is referred to by many as "Our Federalism"....

Id.
Justice Black described "Our Federalism" as
a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State
and National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious
though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests,
always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.

Id.
91. Id. at 54.
92. In a sense, the Younger Court did not need to reach the issue. Ultimately, the
holding was based on an insufficient showing of factors necessary to overcome traditional
equitable principles as they related to state criminal prosecutions. Id. at 56. Thus, the
conflict is between equitable restraint and the right to litigate in federal court, and it does
not implicate the "Our Federalism" component of the decision. Whether or not the argument supporting the right to a federal forum can overcome the traditional doctrine of equity jurisprudence was not played out in the decision, nor will it be contemplated here.
One reason the issue has not been developed is because the later abstention decisions
have been based on "Our Federalism-a much more tenuous justification in light of Congress' intent to provide a federal forum, the Court's position recognizing that intent, and
the fact that our federalism was intended only as a reinforcement of Justice Blaces equity jurisprudence analysis in Younger.
93. Younger itself contained no new restrictions on the right of access to a federal
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under equity jurisprudence, state court criminal defendants were
not given injunctions against further state action even when the
statutes they were being prosecuted under were unconstitutional. 4
In those instances, a federal determination that a state statute was
unconstitutional would not prevent the state court criminal action
from proceeding. Thus, a federal forum would prove meaningless. If
the Younger decision had stopped there, the broader doctrine of civil
rights abstention might not have evolved. Younger would have decided only that where there is a conflict between a defendant's right
to a federal forum and a state's right to enforce its laws in state courts,
the doctrine of equity jurisprudence would militate against allowing
federal interference. Younger went further, however, by creating "Our
Federalism," and indicating that it was an "even more vital
consideration" than equity doctrine.95 It was "Our Federalism" that was
seized upon by future courts, eventually to the exclusion of equity, and
used to establish the more broad based civil rights abstention doctrine.
One indication of the weight afforded to "Our Federalism" was
that the majority chose to rely on that principle, rather than decide
the case, as the respondents requested, under the Anti-Injunction
Act. 6 This is a significant point, for if the Younger Court had concourt for a state court defendant. The decision merely recounted the traditional exceptions to federal equitable restraint, all of which came from earlier cases. See New Orleans
Pub. Servs., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 364 (1989) (referring to the
Younger decision as "far-from-novel"); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335 (1977) (noting
that the Younger doctrine "is by no means a novel doctrine").
There were essentially three exceptions to Younger discussed in that opinion. First,
courts will not abstain when federal jurisdiction is absolutely necessary to protect constitutional rights. 401 U.S. at 45 (citing Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243-44 (1926)).
Under this exception, not only must there be the threat of irreparable harm to the
plaintiff seeking adjudication, but that the harm must be both great and immediate.
Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243 (1926). Second, courts will hear cases when state
prosecutions are undertaken in bad faith or to harass a federal plaintiff. 401 U.S. at 49
(citing Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968)). This exception, has never been
successfully used since it was announced in Younger. WRIGHT ETAL., supra note 4, § 4255,
at 254. Finally, courts will not abstain when there are unusual circumstances which
warrant federal adjudication of a case. 401 U.S. at 53. In explaining the third exception,
the Court provided an example of what might constitute such a circumstance. The Court
found that where a statute was "flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional
prohibitions in every clause, sentence, and paragraph, and in whatever manner and
against whomever an effort might be made to apply it," a federal court could properly
hear the case. Id. at 54 (quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941)). Even when a
provision is unconstitutional on its face, federal courts must allow state courts the
opportunity to construe the provision so as not to violate the Constitution. Id. at 50-51.
94. Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 400 (1941) (holding that criminal proceedings to
enforce a state statute are not to be enjoined by a federal court even if unconstitutional,
in the absence of a definite threat of prosecution and a clear showing of great and immediate danger of irreparable loss).
95. 401 U.S. at 44.
96. Id. at 40. The Anti-Injunction Act is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1993). It pro-
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fined its decision to the language of Anti-Injunction Act, again, the
policy argument of "Our Federalism" would not have been necessary,
and consequently not available for future courts to rely on in expanding abstention doctrine. A decision based on the Anti-Injunction Act would have required future courts to evaluate requests for
injunctions on the basis of three criteria: (1) whether or not Congress has specifically authorized such relief; (2) whether or not the
injunction is "in aid of' the court's jurisdiction; and (3) whether or
not the injunction is required to "protect or effectuate" the judgments of the court. Under this test, a decision to abstain is based
upon a set of known, Congressionally authorized factors. Conversely,
under Younger, the decision to abstain is based on a judicial determination that federal action would "unduly interfere with legitimate
state activities."9 7 Rehnquist has relied on this language to create
civil rights abstention by systematically removing the procedural
conditions upon which Younger was predicated," thereby broadening the circumstances in which "Our Federalism" applies. The result
of that action has been to deny a federal civil rights plaintiff the forum to which he is entitled.
vides in pertinent part: "A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay
proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2283; see also Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 230 (1972) (stating that the Younger
Court 'carefully eschewed any reliance on [28 U.S.C. § 2283] basing its decision instead
upon what the Court called 'Our Federalism'").
Rather than interpreting the language of § 2283, the Court cited only the reasons for
the statute's existence. After admitting that the precise reasons for the policy embodied in
§ 2283 "have never been specifically identified," the Court nevertheless offered "equity
jurisprudence" and "Our Federalism" as the underlying rational for the statute, and proceeded to base its holding on those two concepts. 401 U.S. at 43. Commentators Soifer and
Macgill have noted that it was the substitution of the slogan "Our Federalism" for legislative history that has dominated the development of federalism since the Younger decision. Aviam Soifer & H.C. Macgill, The Younger Doctrine: ReconstructingReconstruction,
55 TEX. L. REV. 1141, 1165 n.124 (1977).
97. 401 U.S. at 44.
98. As noted by the majority and concurring opinions, Younger was limited to cases
in which a state criminal prosecution was already pending. As Justice Black stated for the
majority, "[wie express no view about the circumstances under which federal courts may
act when there is no prosecution pending in state courts at the time the federal proceeding is begun." Id. at 41. Further, Justice Stewart pointed out in the concurrence:
ITihe Court deals only with the proper policy to be followed by a federal court
when asked to intervene... in a criminal prosecution which is contemporaneously pending in a state court.
... [W]e do not deal with the considerations that should govern a federal
court when it is asked to intervene in state civil proceedings .... "
Id. at 54-55 (Stewart, J., concurring). In redefining abstention doctrine, Rehnquist has
removed both of these pre-conditions, and yet, has continued to characterize the new doctrine as expansions of the Younger abstention.
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The Development of Younger Abstention Priorto the
Establishmentof Civil Rights Abstention

Rehnquist was not the first to embark on the expansion of
Younger. In Samuels v. Mackell,99 one of five companion cases to
Younger, the Court extended the Younger decision to declaratory as
well as injunctive relief, arguing that "the basic policy against federal interference with pending state criminal prosecutions will be
frustrated as much by declaratory judgment as it would be by an
injunction."10 While the Samuels case did extend the applicability of
Younger, the decision ultimately remained based on principles of
equity, and not "Our Federalism."' In fact, the term "Our Federalism" was not even used in the case. In that sense, unlike the
changes brought later by Rehnquist, it was not the kind of expansion that has led to the wholesale transformation of the Younger
doctrine.
Between 1972 and 1975, the Court sent conflicting messages as
to the circumstances under which Younger would apply. In Mitchum
v. Foster,"2 a decision in which Rehnquist took no part, the Court
held that § 1983 expressly authorized a suit in equity, and therefore,
was to be construed as a statutory exception to the Anti-Injunction
Act. 0 3 Significantly, the Court also indicated that § 1983 was a part
99. 401 U.S. 66 (1971). Samuels involved a challenge to a New York criminal
anarchy statute which made advocating the overthrow of the government by violence or
any unlawful means a felony punishable by up to 10 years imprisonment and/or a $5,000
fine. The state court defendants were charged with voluntarily organizing a group for the
purpose of advocating the violent overthrow of the State of New York. Samuels v.
Mackell, 288 F. Supp. 348, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), affd, 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
100. 401 U.S. at 73. Discussing the propriety of withholding declaratory relief in
state tax collections cases, the Court stated:
Although we have found no case in this Court dealing with the application of
this doctrine to cases in which the relief sought affects state criminal prosecutions rather than state tax collections, we can perceive no relevant difference
between the two situations with respect to... the propriety of declaratory and
injunctive relief....
Id. at 71-72.
Given that the doctrine of non-interference in tax cases is based on the Tax Injunction Act, and § 1983 actions are excluded from the Anti-Injunction Act, this comparison is
weak at best. See infratext accompanying note 103.
101. 401 U.S. at 68.
102. 407 U.S. 225 (1972). Mitchum involved a challenge to the actions of state judicial and law enforcement officers who had closed down petitioner's bookstore as a public
nuisance. Petitioner Mitchurn alleged a deprivation of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and while the state action was still pending, sought an injunction of the
state's preliminary order which prohibited continued operation of the bookstore. The district court held that the anti-injunction statute applied, thereby denying an opportunity
for the state court defendant to bring his federal claims into federal court. Id. at 227-28.
103. Id. at 242.
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of a "new structure of law that emerged in the post-Civil War era
[with] the role of the Federal Government as a guarantor of basic
federal rights against state power.., clearly established."' ° While
this statement, and the discussion of the legislative history of § 1983
which accompanied it, acknowledged that Congress intended to
create a federal forum for civil rights litigants, 10 5 the decision continued to characterize Younger as being based on "Our Federalism,"
as opposed to principles of equity.1 6 Ironically, it has been this characterization that has led to the undermining of the federal forum
guarantee.
In Gibson v. Berryhill,10 7 the Court affirmed the holding in
Mitchum that § 1983 constituted an express exception to the AntiInjunction Act. The Court cautioned, however, that Mitchum held
only that a district court was not absolutely barred by the Anti-Injunction Act from enjoining a state court proceeding when called
upon to do so in a § 1983 action.' Courts, however, still had discretion to abstain under notions of "equity, comity, and federalism."0 9
By adding that provision, the Court essentially recognized that even
though a plaintiff could invoke § 1983 and § 1343 to defeat the AntiInjunction Act, those sections by themselves are not enough to overcome the principles of "Our Federalism."10 Gibson is important for
two other reasons. First, Justice White, writing for the majority, indicated that certain state administrative proceedings such as actions to remove a professional license"' should be afforded the same
104. Id. at 239. Contrast Mitchum's emphasis on Congress' intent to change the
relationship between the nation and the states, and Younger's emphasis on the framers
intent to establish "Our Federalism." In Younger, the Court stated that "[s]ince the beginning of this country's history Congress has, subject to few exceptions, manifested a
desire to permit state courts to try state cases free from interference by federal courts."
401 U.S. at 43. The Mitchum Court, however, explained that "[tihe predecessor of § 1983
was ... an important part of the basic alteration in our federal system wrought in the Re-

construction era through federal legislation and constitutional amendment." 407 U.S. at
238; see also supra note 53.
105. 407 U.S. at 238-39.
106. Id. at 230-31. "In Younger, this Court emphatically reaffirmed 'the fundamental
policy against federal interference with state criminal prosecutions.'" Id. at 230 (quoting
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,46 (1971)).
107. 411 U.S. 564 (1973).

108. Id. at 573.
109. Id.
110. It should be noted that the Younger Court found the Anti-Injunction Act to be
based on the notions of equity, comity, and federalism. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44
(1971). Thus, in Gibson, the Court came to the odd conclusion that § 1983 and § 1343 circumvented the statute codifying the elements of "Our Federalism," but that the elements
themselves, when invoked by the judiciary, were sufficient to overcome the grant of a federal forum.
111. Gibson involved a state optometry board's actions to remove licenses from optometrists who were not members of the state's professional association. Younger was
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respect given to state judicial proceedings." Traditional equity
doctrine as restated in Younger, however, applied only to court proceedings, and not to administrative actions.' The dicta in Gibson,"4
therefore, appears to be based on the "Our Federalism" component of
Younger, a term which because of its vagueness, could be used to
justify expansion of federal deference to non-court proceedings." 5
Second, Gibson raised the important issue of whether or not Younger
abstention applied to civil cases. Justice White read Younger to
leave open the question of whether or not "Our Federalism" applied
to civil cases." 6 The fact that the Gibson Court raised the question
indicated that Younger could be invoked in civil cases, even though
under the circumstances of the instant case, Younger was not applicable. The ideas that abstention could apply to non-judicial and civil
proceedings had not been expressed in any of the post-Younger decisions prior to Gibson, but were used in subsequent cases to more
fully develop both Younger and civil rights abstention.
Finally, in the last major decision on abstention prior to Rehnquist's initial majority opinion on the subject, Rehnquist concurred
in a decision which resolved one of the issues left open in the
Samuels17 decision. Samuels held that declaratory relief was not
available to a federal plaintiff seeking such relief in response to a
pending state criminal prosecution. Steffel v. Thompson"8 examined
the propriety of such relief when a state criminal prosecution was

held inapplicable because the administrative agency was not an adequate forum in which
the state defendants could vindicate their rights, by reason of bias, and the inability of
the agency to entertain constitutional claims. 411 U.S. at 577.
112. Id. at 576-77.
113. 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971). In Younger, the Court found that "equity jurisprudence"
was one of the sources of the policy of non-interference with state court proceedings. According to the Younger Court, "courts of equity should not act... to restrain a criminal
prosecution, when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law.. . ." Id.
114. Rehnquist cited dicta in Gibson as supporting the proposition that abstention
applied to state administrative proceedings in which important state interests are vindicated, so long as in the course of those proceedings the federal plaintiff would have a full
and fair opportunity to litigate his constitutional claims. Fair Assessment in Real Estate
Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981). FairAssessmentis discussed infra notes 246-74 and
accompanying text.
115. The Younger Court used the term "Our Federalism" to indicate a respect for
state "functions" and "activities." 401 U.S. at 43-44. The concept was not limited, as was
the term "equity jurisprudence," to judicial proceedings. Id. at 43.
116. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 575 (1973). Justice Stewart's concurring
opinion in Younger pointed out explicitly that the majority did not reach the issue of abstention in civil cases, and suggested that on the basis of traditional equity doctrine, civil
actions would not be subject to Younger abstention. 401 U.S. at 55 (Stewart, J., concur-

ring).
117. For a discussion of Samuels, see supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text,
118. 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
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threatened, but not pending."' While the Court held that such relief
was available, 20 it included language in the opinion which continued
to emphasize the federalism component of Younger, as opposed to
only the more narrowly defined doctrine of equity. 21 Additionally,
Rehnquist pointed out in his concurring opinion that filing a federal
case prior to violating a state law would not act as a shield to state
prosecution. 22 This would become the majority opinion one year
later in Hicks v. Miranda.1
III. REHNQUIST AND THE DOCTRmINE OF CIVIL RIGHTS ABSTENTION

A.

The Birth of Civil Rights Abstention

Rehnquist's first majority opinion invoking "Our Federalism"
came in 1975, and was the first decision to cross the line from
Younger abstention to civil rights abstention. In Huffman v. Pursue,

119. Steffel had been threatened with arrest under a Georgia criminal trespass law
in response to his handbilling activities, protesting American involvement in Vietnam, on
an exterior sidewalk of a shopping center. Steffel stopped his handbilling and filed this
suit in federal court. Id. at 455-56.
120. This aspect of the Steffel decision was largely eviscerated by the decision in
Hicks v. Miranda,which held that a prosecutor could initiate state proceedings against a
party even after that party had filed suit in federal court. 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975); see
also O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 498-99 (1974) (holding that the mere possibility of
prosecution under state law does not create an actual controversy for which relief may be
sought).
121. 415 U.S. at 460. "Sensitive to principles of equity, comity, and federalism, we
recognized in Younger v. Harris... that federal courts should ordinarily refrain from enjoining ongoing state criminal prosecutions." Id.; see also Soifer & Macgill, supra note 96,
at 1142 (arguing that the decisions advancing the policy of deference to state courts were
made possible by the Court's opinion in Younger, rather than its precise holding). It is
important to remember that Younger was based specifically on the fact that, under the
circumstances of the case, no exceptions to the principles of equity existed, and not that
federalism itself barred such relief. The exceptions it listed were not exceptions to "Our
Federalism," but were recognized exceptions to traditional equity doctrine. Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971).
122. 415 U.S. at 480. Rehnquist wrote:
I do not believe that a federal plaintiff in a declaratory judgment action can
avoid, by the mere filing of a complaint, the principles so firmly expressed in
Samuels. The plaintiff who continues to violate a state statute after the filing of
his federal complaint does so both at the risk of state prosecution and at the risk
of dismissal of his federal lawsuit. For any arrestprior to resolution of the federal action would constitute a pending prosecution and bar declaratory relief
under the principles ofSamuels.
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
This notion was played out in his majority opinion in Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422
U.S. 922 (1975). Doranis discussed infra notes 162-76 and accompanying text.
123. 422 U.S. 332 (1975). Hicks is discussed infra notes 153-61 and accompanying
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Ltd.,12 petitioners brought a § 1983 challenge against Ohio's public
nuisance law, alleging that its application resulted in a deprivation
of constitutional rights under color of law. 25 Pursue, Ltd. was the
owner of an adult theater showing pornographic films, and brought
the federal suit in response to a state civil proceeding which had
declared plaintiffs movies to be obscene and which resulted in the
closing of the theater and sale of personal property used in the
theater's operation. 126 Rather than appealing the state court decision, Pursue, Ltd. filed the federal action, seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief from the state court order. 127 Relying on the "Our
Federalism" component of Younger, 28 Rehnquist held that civil proceedings that were "akin to a criminal prosecution" were subject to
Younger
restrictions, and therefore, the Court was required to ab9
stain.
This decision, which established what Rehnquist termed the
"civil counterpart to Younger,""3° was important for many reasons.
First, it continued the erosion of the interpretation of Younger as
being based on equitable restraint and federalism, to one of a doc" ' Second, it
trine based wholly on federalism and comity concerns.13
introduced the "state's interest" analysis which has become a central
test in determining the circumstances under which civil rights abstention may be applied. 3 2 Third, the Huffman decision prohibits a
124. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).

125. Id. at 598. The statute provided that a place exhibiting obscene films is a nuisance requiring closure of the establishment for up to one year, and sale of the establishment's personal property used in furtherance of creating the nuisance. Id. at 595-97.
126. Id. at 595-98.

127. Id. at 598.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 106, 109, 121. Mitchum, Gibson, and Steffel
all interpreted Younger as being based on the concerns of comity and federalism. Those

decisions, however, did not completely discount the principles of equity, upon which
Younger was also founded. While Rehnquist did mention the equity portion of the

Younger decision, he did so in questioning its precedential value in the case at bar.
129. 420 U.S. at 604.
130. Id. at 611.
131. See Barry Friedman, A Revisionist Theory of Abstention, 88 MICH. L. REV. 530

(1989). "In Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., then-Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
divorced the equity rationale from the Younger abstention doctrine.. . . Id. at 556 n.118
(citation omitted); see also infra note 137.
132. 420 U.S. at 604; see discussion infra notes 138-45 and accompanying text.
Justice Blackmun focused on the relation of the state's interest to the Court's decisions to
abstain in his concurring opinion in Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 448 (1977)
(Blackmun, J., concurring). Blackman articulated the view that a balancing test was being used by the Court, weighing the federal interest (which he does not specify) against
the state interest of vindicating rights in its own courts. Younger and Huffman were cases
in which the state's interests (administration of its criminal laws and interest in quasi-

criminal state proceedings in which the state was a party) constituted strong enough interests to mandate abstention. Id. at 448.
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would-be federal plaintiff from initiating federal court proceedings
until all state appellate remedies have been exhausted.'33 Finally,
the decision forces potential civil rights plaintiffs to comply with
state appellate procedures by decreeing that failure to do so will act
as a bar to federal action. 34 These four points, combined with the
more important holding that Younger applied to civil cases, distinguish the type of abstention contemplated in Huffman from traditional Younger abstention. Huffman represents a new direction in
abstention doctrine that has developed almost exclusively through
Rehnquist's opinions into the doctrine of civil rights abstention; a
doctrine which encompasses, but is much broader than, Younger
abstention.
The transformation of the grounds on which Younger rested has
had a significant impact on the expansion of "Our Federalism." In
Huffman, Rehnquist stated that Younger was based on "the principles of comity and Federalism. 3 5 It was important to assert that
Younger was based on federalism, because, as Rehnquist admitted,
the element of equitable restraint, on which Younger was also
founded, could not justify this type of expansion: "Strictly speaking
[equity doctrine] is not available to mandate federal restraint in civil
cases." 13 6 In order to apply Younger to civil cases, Rehnquist needed
37
an alternative justification: one consistent with "Our Federalism."
That justification proved to be the "state's interest" test as applied to abstention analysis.3 8 The "state's interest" test evaluated
the weight of the interest that a state had in prosecuting actions in

133. 420 U.S. at 608. Compare the rule in Huffman with the rule announced in
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruledon other grounds by Monell v. Department
of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), that § 1983 was enacted to provide a federal remedy
in a federal court. While Huffman does not eliminate the possibility of federal review of a
federal issue, it does eliminate the opportunity for federal fact-finding. 420 U.S. at 608.
134. 420 U.S. at 611 n.22.
135. Id. at 602.
136. Id. at 604. Rehnquist avoided addressing the conflict between the federalism
rationale of Younger abstention, which does not distinguish between state criminal and
civil proceedings, and the equity rationale, which is only applicable to state criminal proceedings, by labeling the type of prosecution which occurred in Huffman as being similar
to a criminal proceeding, and then speculating that "an offense to the State's interest in
the nuisance litigation is likely to be every bit as great as it would be were this a criminal
proceeding." Id.
137. See SUE DAVIS, JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND THE CONSTITUTION 182 (1989) (arguing
that Younger's foundations in equity would suggest that the doctrine would be limited to
criminal proceedings, and therefore, the distinction made in Huffrnan that Younger isbased on "Our Federalism" is an important one); Soifer & Macgill, supra note 96, at 1178
(arguing that in order to apply abstention in this instance, Rehnquist had to "liberate"
"Our Federalism" from its equitable underpinnings).
138. 420 U.S. at 604-05.
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its own courts.'39 As noted in Younger, states have a strong interest
in trying criminal cases in state courts, hence federal intervention
should be kept to a minimum. 14 0 Under the Huffman state interest
analysis, courts may determine whether or not a state has an interest in trying a civil matter in state court that is as compelling as its
interest in criminal prosecution. If the interest rises to the level of
interest in a criminal action, then principles of "Our Federalism"
will apply, and abstention is required.' 4 ' This represents a subtle
shift in focus from what in Younger was deference to state courts
based on traditional equity notions' to deference based on the nature of the state's interest in a particular claim. If, indeed, this is the
situation (and from subsequent decisions, it does appear to be the
case that a state's interest in the pending litigation is determinative), 4 3 then it seems to follow that a state would have an equally
compelling interest in litigating § 1983 actions in state court. By the
very nature of the statute, § 1983 actions implicate state agents or
statutes, and certainly states have an interest in what happens to
its employees or laws. Under the "state interest" test of Huffman,
"Our Federalism" would suggest that federal courts be required to
abstain from hearing § 1983 cases in their courts, despite the fact
that § 1983 is exempt from the Anti-Injunction Act. 44 While this result may seem exaggerated, it is not foreclosed by Huffman. Despite
equating Ohio's interest in trying nuisance law violators with prosecuting criminals, Rehnquist does not elaborate on how he arrived at
that conclusion.'4 5 No test is enunciated explaining how a court
might determine the importance of a particular state interest. The
result in Huffman suggests that a judicially created doctrine of abstention has taken precedent over express statutory language to the
contrary. "Our Federalism" has trumped our nation's statutes.
Perhaps Rehnquist did not elaborate on the analysis required
to determine the importance of a state's interest because as a practical matter, the issue in most cases is moot. Under Huffman, a fed139. Id. at 605.
140. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
141. 420 U.S. at 604-05.
142. 401 U.S. at 43-44.
143. In cases such as Steffel, where the state's interest was more attenuated by the
fact that there was no pending state litigation, abstention was not granted. Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974); see also Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 449 (1977)
(Blackmun, J., concurring). For decisions in which Rehnquist has considered the state's
interest important, see cases discussed infra notes 186-205, 246-74, 284-92 and accompanying text.
144. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242-43 (1972); see supra text accompanying
note 103.
145. See Soifer & Macgill, supra note 96, at 1185 (suggesting that the Court in

making such determinations is limited only by such rules as the Court cares to devise).
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eral plaintiff in a situation like Pursue, Ltd.'s is required not only to
litigate in state court, but also to exhaust state remedies prior to
filing a federal action. 46 The decision in effect, requires federal court
judges to dismiss (as opposed to stay) any claim filed by a party to a
pending state court action, be it civil or criminal in nature. 147 Dismissal also will occur in the event that a state court defendant fails
to properly comply with state procedures." A judge, therefore, does
not necessarily need to go through the "state's interest" analysis in
order to abstain. She can merely resort to exhaustion to dismiss the
federal plaintiff.
The Huffman Court's successful expansion of Younger to civil
proceedings has been the most significant expansion of abstention to
date. 4 9 Once abstention was found to apply in civil matters, all that
remained to be determined was the extent to which it would be applied. With Rehnquist leading the way, the Court embarked quickly
to expand abstention in civil rights cases. While the Court continued
(and continues) to refer to abstention in these cases as Younger abstention, or increasingly Younger-Huffman abstention, 5 0 it has been
applying a doctrine that bears little resemblance to Younger. One by
one, the elements that were originally required before Younger could
146. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 608 (1975) ("[We believe that a
necessary concomitant of Younger is that a party in appellee's [Pursue, Ltd.] posture must
exhaust his state appellate remedies before seeking relief in the District Court, unless he
can bring himself within one of the exceptions specified in Younger."). But see Patsy v.
Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982) (holding that a § 1983 plaintiff is generally entitled
to a federal forum, and therefore, need not exhaust state judicial or administrative
remedies before suing in federal court). Patsy is discussed supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text. Patsy, however, is limited by Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled on othergrounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986), which held that when
a § 1983 plaintiff claims a deprivation of property without due process of law, the existence of state provided post-deprivation remedies constitutes due process. Parrattis discussed infra notes 227-44 and accompanying text. In such cases, a potential § 1983
plaintiff must pursue state remedies.
147. Exhaustion means that a criminal defendant in state court will never see a district court, absent a Younger exception. Under Younger abstention, a claim is dismissed,
and not stayed; therefore, a state court defendant may not "reserve" federal claims for
federal adjudication. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411,
415-18 (1968) (holding that where a federal court has stayed a proceeding in deference to
a concurrent state court proceeding, a party may, by express motion, reserve federal
claims for determination by a federal court). The defendant would have to present all
claims, making them subject to res judicata, even if he could file an action in district
court. However, because the case will already have been decided by the Supreme Court by
way of a denied appeal (which is on the merits) or an actual decision, he will be unable to
do so.
148. 420 U.S. at 611 n.22. This prevents a state court litigant from accessing federal
court by simply failing to appeal the state court decision.
149. Soifer & Macgill, supra note 96, at 1174 n.149, 1192.
150. See cases cited supra note 12.
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be applied have been removed. Civil rights abstention began with
the removal of the criminal proceeding requirement in Huffman,
and has steadily evolved from that case.
Younger, however, has continued to be the reference point both
for scholars and the courts in discussing abstention." 1 This Comment shifts the focus from whether or not the post-Younger cases
have been "permissible" or "impermissible" extensions of that doctrine5 2 to an argument that civil rights abstention is a separate and
distinct branch of abstention, aimed not at deference to state courts,
but at relieving the courts of "unwanted" civil rights claims. Civil
rights abstention is characterized by three elements: (1) the reliance
on "Our Federalism" to expand the scope of abstention; (2) the
removal of the Younger restrictions limiting the use of abstention;
and (3) the limitation on the right of access to federal court. The
presence of all three elements distinguish civil rights abstention
from Younger abstention. Younger abstention relied on equity jurisprudence and prior case law to establish the parameters of abstention whereas civil rights abstention relies on "Our Federalism" to
justify the application of abstention.
B.

The Expansion of Civil Rights Abstention

1. Removing Restrictions: The Application of Civil Rights Abstention to Non-Pending Proceedings. The three elements of civil
rights abstention are easily identifiable in Hicks v Miranda,"3 a case
decided just one month after the Huffman decision. In Hicks, Justice
White, writing for a majority which included Rehnquist, applied
Younger abstention to criminal proceedings which were not pending

151. In the six opinions on abstention written by Rehnquist, and the four additional
opinions on abstention, the Court refers to Younger as the basis for abstaining. See supra

note 5. Commentators writing on these opinions have noted the enormous changes in the
application of Younger, but continue to characterize the extensions as expansions of
Younger, and not a separate and distinct doctrine. See supra note 13 and accompanying

text.
152. Take for example this title: The Ultimate Expansion of the Younger Doctrine:
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., cited supra note 12. The point is that after a certain threshold, a doctrine can become so indistinguishable from that on which it was based as to constitute a new doctrine. When the Court relied on "Our Federalism" to the exclusion of
equity, Younger abstention became civil rights abstention.
153. 422 U.S. 332 (1975). Vincent Miranda was the owner of an adult theater whose
employees had been indicted on criminal obscenity charges in California state court. Miranda, who had not been named in the action, filed suit in federal court on November 29,

1973, alleging that the obscenity statute was unconstitutional, and asking for injunctive
relief for return of the films which had been declared obscene in state court. On January
15, 1974, one day after completion of service on the federal complaint, the state prosecutors amended the state claim to include Miranda as a defendant. Id. at 335-40.
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at the time that the federal action was initiated.' 4 The Court found
that federal petitioners who were not parties to a state suit at the
time the complaint was filed, but who were subsequently implicated
in a state criminal proceeding, were required to proceed as defendants in state court. 5 ' The Court characterized the rule in Younger
as one "designed to 'permit state courts to try state cases free from
interference by federal courts, '""5' 6 and went on to say that no other
"case in this Court has held that for Younger v. Harris to apply, the
state criminal proceedings must be pending on the day the federal
case is filed." 57 White found that a federal action filed by a statecourt non-party who had a "substantial stake" in the state litigation
constituted interference with a state court proceeding and as such
mandated Younger abstention. 5 8 In effect, this rule provides the
state prosecutor a "reverse removal" power to defeat the plaintiffs
choice of a federal forum simply by adding him to (or initiating) an
action against him in state court prior to any "proceedings of substance on the merits" in federal court.'5 9 This aspect of the decision
has been criticized as creating a "race to the court house'--a race
that the federal petitioner can not win.16°
154. Id. at 349.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 349 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971)). The Court in this
instance has quoted language from the decision out of context. The quotation in Younger
is: "Since the beginning of this country's history Congress has, subject to few exceptions,
manifested a desire to permit state courts to try state cases free from interference by federal courts." Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971). The Younger Court used this sentence as an introduction to a discussion of the Anti-Injunction Act (an act which does not
apply to § 1983 actions), which itself was, according to the Court, based in part on notions
of "Our Federalism." Stated more accurately, it is "Our Federalism" which effectuates the
goals of non-interference. As for the "rule" in Younger, the holding of the case rested on
the fact that under the circumstances of the case, the factors necessary under equity jurisprudencemilitating federal intervention were absent. See discussion supranote 91.
157. 422 U.S. at 349. Indeed, the Younger Court left this issue open saying- 'We express no view about the circumstances under which federal courts may act when there is
no prosecution pending in state courts at the time the federal proceeding is begun." 401
U.S. at 41.
158. 422 U.S. at 348-49. The "substantial stake" in the state litigation was manifested by- (1) intertwined interests with the state court defendants; and (2) an interest in
recovering property. Id. The decision dealt only with criminal proceedings, and did not
consider whether or not abstention would be applicable in the case of a state civil proceeding brought after a federal action has been filed. Under Huffman, however, it seems likely
that if the civil proceeding is "akin to a criminal proceeding," Hicks would apply. Huffman
v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975).
159. 422 U.S. at 349.
160. In his dissent in Hicks, Justice Stewart criticized the majority both for creating
the race, and allowing the state to always win:
There is, to be sure, something unseemly about having the applicability of
Younger doctrine turn solely on the outcome of a race to the courthouse. The
rule the Court adopts today, however, does not eliminate that race; it merely
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With regard to civil rights abstention, Hicks touches on all
three elements of the doctrine. The Court relied on the principles of
"Our Federalism" to justify application of abstention to parties who
were not parties to the state case. 161 The Court also removed the
formerly recognized Younger requirement that the state court action
be pending. These two elements, the use of "Our Federalism" and
removal of Younger restrictions, combine to create the third element,
a denial of access to the federal courts. Hicks effectively denies a
party who alleges an injury under § 1983, but who is not a party to
any state action, the right to a federal forum for redress of his injuries. Younger abstention did not contemplate action against parties
not already subject to a state action. In order to reach the result in
Hicks, the Court had to apply principles of federalism to the circumstances. The Court, however, failed to apply the equity analysis
portion of Younger, a case that applied only to pending state criminal proceedings. This failure stems from the fact that in Huffman,
Rehnquist divorced the idea of equity from federalism as set forth in
Younger, leaving the less restricted notion of "Our Federalism"
available to extend abstention.
Rehnquist relied on the Hicks analysis just one week later in
writing the majority opinion in Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc..162 In
Doran, three operators of bars featuring topless dancing brought a
federal action to enjoin enforcement of a newly enacted local ordinance prohibiting such entertainment. 6 ' Up until the filing of the
federal action, all three operators had been in compliance with the
local law.' 64 The day after the federal suit was filed, however, one of
the operators resumed the topless entertainment, and, as a result,

permits the State to leave the mark later, run a shorter course, and arrive first
at the finish line.
Id. at 354 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also Soifer & Macgill, supra note 96, at 1192-94
(characterizing the Hicks decision as unsupported and cavalier); Gerald P. Lopez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice:Seven Weeks in the Life of a Rebellious Collaboration, 77
GEo. L.J. 1603, 1704-05 (1989) (asserting that Hicks allows the lawyer for the opposing
party to defeat federal jurisdiction); Mark P. Henriques, Note, Desuetude and Declaratory
Judgment: A New Challenge to Obsolete Laws, 76 VA. L. REV. 1057, 1066-67 (1990)
(arguing that Hicks defeats protection afforded in Steffel). But see Althouse, supra note
14, at 1000 (characterizing critics of Hicks as viewing the allocation of the enforcement of
federal rights as a power struggle rather than a cooperative effort); Calvin R. Massey,
Abstention and the ConstitutionalLimits of the JudicialPower of the United States, 1991
B.Y.U. L. REV. 811, 836-37 (1991) (arguing that criticism of Hicks on the basis that it
violates the traditional notion that a federal action could not be ousted by a state filing is
misplaced).
161. 422 U.S. at 349.
162. 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
163. Id. at 924.
164. Id. at 925.
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was indicted under the challenged local statute.165 Relying on reasoning developed in Hicks that a federal plaintiff could be required
to litigate in state court, Rehnquist found that the district court
should have abstained with respect to the one operator who had resumed activities.'66 The district court had determined that the two
operators who had maintained compliance were entitled to injunctive relief, and that it would be "anomalous" not to grant relief to the
third. 67 The appellate court rejected the argument that abstention
should be applied to all three operators, citing a desire to avoid
conflicting litigation in state and federal courts, and on grounds of
judicial efficiency.' 6 Rehnquist held that neither of those concerns
could overcome the principles of federalism, which counseled abstention. 16 9 He wrote:
[W]e are faced with the necessity of determining whether the holdings of
Younger, Steffel, and Samuels v. Mackell must give way before such inter-

ests in efficient judicial administration as were relied upon by the Court of
Appeals. We think that the interest of avoiding conflicting outcomes in the
litigation of similar issues, while entitled to substantial deference in a
to the claims of federalunitary system, must of necessity be subordinated
70
ism in this particular area of the law.

By applying federalism in this way, Rehnquist was actually defeating one of the purposes of Younger. Duplicative litigation is
squarely one of the evils Younger was meant to redress.17 ' "Our Federalism" was now taking on a life of its own-free from Younger restrictions, free from equity constraints.
Doran relied on the Hicks analysis to hold that a federal plaintiff could be "removed" from federal court. Rehnquist, however, was
forced to contend with White's argument in Hicks, that similar parties, with intertwined interests, could be considered together for
purposes of Younger abstention.7 2 In Doran, the similarity of parties
argument failed to keep all of the federal plaintiffs in federal court.
Rehnquist acknowledged that "[w]hile there plainly may be some
165. Id.
166. Id. at 929.
167. Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 364 F. Sulp. 478,482 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), affd., 501 F.2d
18 (2d Cir. 1974), affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422
U.S. 922 (1975).

168. 422 U.S. at 927-28.
169. Id. at 928.
170. Id. at 927-28 (citations omitted). It is not clear from the text of the opinion what
Rehnquist was referring to by 'this particular area of the law." If he is referring to the
cases cited in that paragraph, then he is talking about civil rights law, and seems to indicate that in other areas, abstention may not be appropriate under otherwise similar circumstances.
171. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
172. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 348-49 (1975).
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circumstances in which legally distinct parties are so closely related
that they should all be subject to the Younger considerations which

govern any one of them, this is not such a case

....

"173

This state-

ment, however, does not answer the question of why the parties
were not considered to be sufficiently similar. Indeed, many of the
characteristics that White found compelling in Hicks7 4 were also
present in Doran,such as intertwined interests of the parties, representation by the same counsel, and a substantial stake in the outcome. 175 Rehnquist dismissed the "similarity" argument with the
contention that because the three operators in Doran were
"unrelated in terms of ownership,
control, and management," each
176
could be considered separately.
In the development of civil rights abstention, Doran stands for
much of what Hicks had previously established. It removes the pendency requirement for state proceedings established in Younger, and
it expands federalism to a point where it can be used to actually defeat certain goals of the Younger decision. Consequently, the Court
limits the § 1343 right of access to federal courts, by denying a federal forum to a party who has properly invoked such a forum.
2. Enlarging the Abstention Arena: The Application of Abstention to Executive or Agency Action. Rehnquist wrote for the Court
again one year later in Rizzo v. Goode.177 In Rizzo, a group of community organizations brought a § 1983 claim against the Mayor of
Philadelphia, alleging a pattern of police misconduct and mistreatment of minority citizens of the city. 7 ' The Court concluded that no
"case or controversy" existed, and therefore, it had no jurisdiction
over the case. 79 Because this case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, it is not technically an abstention decision. The case, however,
is important to the development of civil rights abstention. Rehnquist
173. 422 U.S. at 928. It is hard to imagine that the Court would approve of the
results of a decision that two or more parties like those in Doran are sufficiently related
so as to be treated similarly for purposes of abstention. For example, if partyA is a defendant in a state suit to which party B is not and both are plaintiffs in a federal civil rights
action, then a decision by a federal court to abstain that applied to both would require
party B to either bring a civil suit based on federal law in state court, or hope for a favor-

able resolution of the federal issue in A's criminal case. In the alternative, if the similarity of the parties defeated abstention, both parties would be allowed to proceed in federal
court. This result seems unlikely, as it would violate the principles of non-interference

with state functions by possibly immunizing federal plaintiffs from state criminal action.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

422 U.S. at 348-49.
422 U.S. at 928-29.
Id.
423 U.S. 362 (1976).
Id. at 366-67.
Id. at 371-72.
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used the opportunity to extend the application of federalism to state
executive officials, in addition to state courts.180 He wrote: "[T]he
principles of federalism... have applicability where injunctive relief
is sought, not against the judicial branch of the state government,
but against those in charge of an executive branch of an agency of
state or local governments .... .1 8 1 Though unarticulated in the
opinion, the holding implies that Younger may be applicable to a
situation where there is no pending state action whatsoever. Unlike
Hicks or Doran, where there was a state proceeding at some point
during the course of the federal action, no such action was contemplated by either party in Rizzo.182 The Court determined, however,
that Younger would still apply if it appeared that the federal action
would interfere with executive branch functions. 183 Whereas in
Younger, "Our Federalism" was used to address the interrelation of
the state and federal courts,"M Rehnquist expanded federalism beyond that scope to encompass the relationship between the federal
courts and state executive officers. Yet, it is these very officials to
which § 1983 and § 1343 were meant to apply. 8 ' State officials, by
the very nature of their positions, seem most likely to engage in the
type of action that would deny citizens their constitutional rights.
Section 1343 gives such citizens a right to litigate in federal court.
But "Our Federalism," and more specifically, one Justice's notion of
"Our Federalism," acts to deny the aggrieved his statutory right to
proceed in federal court. This is one of the hallmarks of civil rights
abstention; it conflicts with the statutory grant of jurisdiction given
to civil rights plaintiffs by Congress through § 1343. Rehnquist uses
"Our Federalism" to abrogate this grant, and in the process enlarges
its scope to encompass state executive officials. The Younger requirement of a pending criminal action is ignored, as is the fact that
Younger applied only to the state judiciary, and not the other
branches of government.

180. Id. at 380.
181. Id.
182. See id. at 371.
183. Id. at 380. Rehnquist explicitly drew this conclusion in Fair Assessment in Real
Estate Ass'n v. Mcnary, 454 U.S. 100, 112 (1981). FairAssessment is discussed infra notes
246-74 and accompanying text.
184. It is true that the definition of "Our Federalism" as used in Younger did not
limit itself to deference for state judicial functions only. As it was applied, however, "Our
Federalism" stood for the proposition that federal courts were not to enjoin state courts.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,43-44 (1971).
185. See supra part I; see also 454 U.S. at 123 n.11 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(suggesting that the very reason for the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was
that there existed at the time "more than a modest distrust" of the ability of state governments to safeguard a citizen's civil rights).
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3. The Development of the State's Interest Test to Defeat Federal
Adjudication of FederalRights. Rehnquist continued the simultaneous expansion of federalism and limitation on access to federal
courts in his opinion in Juidice v. Vail.18 6 In Juidice, the state court
defendant Vail brought a § 1983 action against a county court justice, alleging that the statutory provisions under which he was being
punished were unconstitutional.187 Vail had been found in contempt
of court for failing to pay a judgment debt, and for failing to appear
88
at numerous hearings and proceedings to explain the delinquency.
After nine months of dodging court proceedings at various state
court levels, Vail was arrested and jailed pursuant to a county court
order.'8 9 Vail then brought the federal action, claiming that the
statutes under which the county court had acted violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 9 ' The federal district court declined to abstain
on the basis that Younger applied only to criminal proceedings, and
that Huffman only applied to civil actions which were "closely akin
to a criminal proceeding."191 Rehnquist held, however, that Younger
and Huffman were not to be confined solely to the types of state action present in those cases. 92 His conclusion was based on an interpretation of "comity," as expressed in the Younger opinion, as encompassing deference not only to certain judicial proceedings, but to
the broader category of "state functions" as well. 93 Based on this
reading, Rehnquist found that abstention was applicable to proceedings in which the state had an "important" interest, whether the
proceeding was labeled criminal, quasi-criminal, or civil. 194 As in
Huffman, the Court, without providing a means of evaluation, proclaimed that the state's interest in the contempt proceeding was
sufficient to warrant the application of federalism and consequently
186. 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
187. Id. at 328-29.

188. Id. at 329.
189. Id. at 330.

190. Id.
191. Id. at 333.
192. Id. at 334.

193. Id. "[Tihe '"more vital consideration"' behind the Younger doctrine of nonintervention lay not in the fact that the state criminal process was involved but rather in '"the

notion of 'comity' ... ."'" Id. (quoting Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 601 (1975)
(quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971))). While it is true that Younger used
the terms "state functions" and "state institutions" in discussing comity and "Our
Federalism," the Court had not yet applied abstention to instances beyond judicial proceedings. Rizzo indicated that the Court was moving in the direction of applying abstention in cases involving state executive and administrative branches, but was decided on
other grounds. Despite the broad language, "comity" in Younger was discussed in the
framework of historical justification for the Anti-Injunction Act. Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37,43 (1971).
194. 430 U.S. at 335.

1994]

CIVIL RIGHTS ABSTENTION

537

abstention. 9 ' Despite the development of a test for determining the
state's interest, Rehnquist made it apparent that the state's interest
no longer had to rise to the level of its interest in criminal prosecution. According to Rehnquist:
Perhaps [the State's interest in deciding contempt cases] is not quite as
important as is the State's interest in the enforcement of its criminal laws
or even its interest in the maintenance of a quasi-criminal proceeding
great
such as was involved in Huffman. But we think it is of sufficiently
19 6
import to require application of the principles of those cases.

Because Rehnquist and the Court had already divorced equity
from comity, 97 it was now possible to argue in favor of a diminished
state interest as warranting federal deference. If Younger had been
confined to its equity rationale, the Court would not have been able
to "weigh" state interests, since abstention would apply only when
the state proceeding was a criminal action. The balancing that the
Court engaged in focused abstention analysis away from the nature
and merits of the petitioner's claim, to a judiciary's assessment of
the state's interest in litigating the petitioner's issues in its own
state courts. 9 8 The abstention decision is based on speculation that
federal intervention would be "'an offense to the State's interest,"' 99
as opposed to the jurisdictional merits of the claim itself. Section
1343 provides that district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action authorized by law.'00 Neither § 1343 nor its substantive counterpart § 1983 say anything about deference to competing
state interests.' ° ' Yet under Juidice, a judicial determination that an
issue is "important" to a state will override § 1343 jurisdiction and
remove the federal plaintiff from federal court.
The Juidice opinion did not stop there, however. Rehnquist
further delineated civil rights abstention by pointing out that state
court defendants need only have the opportunity to present their
federal claims in state court for Younger abstention to be applicable.2 °2 Failure to bring the federal claims bars the state court defendant from challenging in federal court the adequacy of the state forum for hearing such claims." 3 A state court defendant is required,
therefore, to bring federal claims for adjudication by the state court,
which in turn means that collateral estoppel will bar relitigation of
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
See supranotes 131, 137.
Soifer & Macgill, supra note 96, at 1185-86.
430 U.S. at 336 (quoting Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975).
The text of § 1343 appears supranote 18.
The text of § 1983 appears supranote 18.
430 U.S. at 337.
Id.
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the issue. While this is the case under traditional Younger abstention, the difference is that now a state court defendant must predict
whether or not a federal judge will determine that the state court
proceeding is one subject to abstention, and accordingly decide
whether or not to bring the federal issue in state court. If the state
defendant were to raise the federal issue in state court, and latter
bring a federal action for declaratory or injunctive relief from the
state action, even if the federal court did not abstain, the federal issue would be subject to collateral estoppel, and the state finding of
fact would stand. On the other hand, if the federal issue is not
brought, and a federal court abstains, the issue is lost. Under
Younger, a state court defendant knew whether or not a federal
court would abstain, and therefore, knew whether or not it was
proper to raise the federal issue. Even under Huffman, a state defendant could make a determination under the "akin to criminal
proceedings" standard. Under Juidice, however, a state defendant
does not have such guidance. Federal courts have greater discretion
to determine that the state's interest warrants abstention. 20 ' The result is that the state court defendant/federal petitioner has lost the
opportunity for a federal finding of fact, which, as Justice Brennan
pointed out in his dissent in Juidice, the federal petitioner is entitled. 0 5
In terms of civil rights abstention analysis, Juidice used comity
and federalism to expand the applicability of abstention beyond the
limits of either Younger or Huffinan. It announced a more lenient
standard by which state interests would be deemed sufficient to
warrant abstention. Finally, the opinion disregards Congress' intent
as manifested by § 1343 to provide a federal forum to vindicate federal rights.
Two months later, in Trainor v. Hernandez, °5 the Court again
relied on comity and federalism to find that abstention was applicable to a civil suit which was brought by a state, but which could have
been brought by a private party.20 7 In Trainor, the State of Illinois
brought an action against Hernandez in state court for recovery of
monies allegedly procured illegally by welfare fraud. 0 8 Hernandez
204. See Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 663-65 (1978) (expressing that
federal district judges enjoy a broad and largely unreviewable discretion to stay proceedings in light of pending litigation).

205. 430 U.S. at 343 (quoting England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners,
375 U.S. 411, 416 (1964)).
206. 431 U.S. 434 (1977).
207. Id. at 439-40. Although Rehnquist did not write this opinion, it is an important
development in civil rights abstention, embodying many of the same ideas that Rehnquist
relied on in extending Younger to civil cases.
208. Id. at 435-36.
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filed suit in federal court alleging that the attachment procedures
used by the state prior to the filing of the state action deprived him
of property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 2°9 The district court refused to abstain on grounds that
the action was one which could have been brought by a private
party, and that it was mere happenstance that the case involved the
state as a plaintiff in the state action.210 Justice White, writing for
the majority, disagreed, and applied Younger and Huffman to the
facts, interpreting the "more vital consideration" of comity clause
from Younger2 ' as standing for a broad non-interference policy toward state courts, independent of any criminal/non-criminal case
distinction. 2 White distilled the notion of "Our Federalism" down to
a policy indicating that disruption of state suits, combined with the
possible appearance that the federal courts did not have confidence
in the ability of state courts to resolve federal issues, would be
enough to trigger federal court abstention.2 3 While the court specifically declined to determine whether Younger applied to all civil
cases,21 4 it did conclude that the principles of Younger and Huffman
taken together were broad enough to prohibit federal court interference with an ongoing civil enforcement action brought by the state
in its sovereign capacity. 5 Essentially, Trainor stands for the
proposition that you can't fight city hall, at least not in federal court.
209. Id. at 438.
210. Id. at 444.
211. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
212. 431 U.S. at 444.
213. Id. at 446. According to White:
[The] disruption of suits by the State in its sovereign capacity, when combined
with the negative reflection on the State's ability to adjudicate federal claims
that occurs whenever a federal court enjoins a pending state proceeding, leads
us to the conclusion that the interests of comity and federalism on which
Younger and Samuels u. Mackell primarily rest apply in full force here.
Id.
White characterizes Younger and Samuels as resting primarily on comity and federalism. As indicated earlier, the specific holding in Younger rested on equity. Id.; see text
accompanying supra note 91. The same is true of Samuels. In Samuels, Black explained
that "the same equitable principles relevant to the propriety of an injunction must be
taken into consideration by federal district courts in determining whether to issue a declaratory judgment." Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 68, 73 (1971). The words "comity" and
"federalism" do not even appear in the Samuels opinion.
214. 431 U.S. at 444 n.8.
215. Id. at 444. The Court used the word "ongoing" rather than "pending" in
Trainor.Id. Recall the Hicks decision, in which the federal defendant was able to remove
the plaintiff from federal court by filing an action against the plaintiff in state court prior
to any "proceedings of substance on the merits" in federal court. Hicks v. Miranda, 422
U.S. 332, 349 (1975). Hicks turned on the language of a pending action. Whether a state
suit filed after a federal action has been brought could be considered "ongoing" is a different question, and was left unresolved by the Hicks Court.
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Although Trainor was not authored by Rehnquist, it is an important case in the development of civil rights abstention, as it continued to carve out exceptions to the criminal proceeding requirement of Younger. Whereas Huffman and Juidice decided what degree of interest a state needed to show in order to obtain a dismissal
of a federal suit on abstention grounds, Trainor dismisses that inquiry altogether, and states that, absent existing exceptions to federal abstention, whenever the state is acting in its sovereign capacity, abstention is required. The expansion was based on comity and
at the expense of the civil rights plaintiffs right to a
federalism, and
2 16
forum.
federal
4. The Shift in Analysis from the Adequacy of the State Interest
to the Adequacy of the State Forum. Rehnquist returned to the forefront of abstention doctrine analysis with his majority opinion in
Moore v. Sims. 217 Moore involved Texas' procedure for assuming
custody of children who appear to be victims of child abuse.21 " The
Sims' children had been removed from their parents' custody, and
held by the state for 42 days without a hearing, at which point the
Sims filed the federal action seeking an injunction requiring the return of their children. 219 Because there was evidence of confusion at
the state level as to how and in what venue to proceed,2 ° the district
court declined to abstain on grounds that there was no single state
proceeding in which 2the Sims would be able to apply for relief on
constitutional issues. 21 Rehnquist characterized the district court's
analysis as "misplaced"222 and suggested that "the only pertinent inquiry [in abstention analysis] is whether the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise the constitutional claims [that
could be raised in the federal forum]."223 Rehnquist shifted the focus
from the nature and merits of the petitioners' claim to the interests
of the state. Not only are courts to consider the state's interest in
216. Only in dissent is the right to a federal forum discussed. 431 U.S. at 450
(Brennan, J., dissenting).

217. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979).
218. Id. at 418.
219. Id. at 437-38.
220. Id. at 422-24. Due to the nature of the case (child custody) there were a number
of administrative as well as judicial proceedings which Sims was required to pursue. The
district court found that abstention was not applicable to non-judicial proceedings, and
that it was inappropriate to sever the case for abstention purposes. Id. at 424.
221. Id. Although Rehnquist fails to acknowledge it, there is support for this holding
in the Younger decision itself. The Younger Court found that "the threat to the plaintiffs
federally protected rights must be one that cannot be eliminated by his defense against a
single criminal prosecution." Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,46 (1971).
222. 442 U.S. at 431.
223. Id. at 430.
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litigating the matter in state court (as was done in Huffman, Doran,
and Juidice), but now they are to consider the nature of the state's
forum as well.224
By making the nature of the forum the threshold question, Rehnquist removed abstention analysis one step further from the jurisdictional merits of the claim itself. In Huffman and Juidice,
rather than deciding the abstention issue on the basis of the claim
presented under § 1343, the Court instead looked to the state's interest in litigating the issue in state court. Moore and Trainor retreated even further from the "state's interest" analysis-indicating
that perhaps any interest is now sufficient to warrant abstentionto an evaluation of the adequacy of the state forum itself. As long as
the state forum allows defendants to raise federal issues, the analysis ends, and abstention applies. The federal plaintiffs' rights under
§ 1343 are not even considered.
The reliance on the forum analysis is based on federalism. To
allow federal courts to interfere with state courts adjudicating combined state and federal issues would "prevent the informed evolution
of state policy by state tribunals. The price extracted in terms of
comity would only be outweighed if state courts were not competent
to adjudicate federal constitutional claims-a postulate we have repeatedly and emphatically rejected."225 According to Rehnquist's
opinion in Moore, absent certain exceptions to Younger, only state
forum inadequacy can overcome strict adherence to comity and federalism.
Moore advances the doctrine of civil rights abstention by using
federalism to shift focus from the federal petitioners claim to the
adequacy of the state forum in which it could be litigated. The Court
continues to apply Younger to an ever widening array of civil suits,
now including child custody proceedings. Further, as Justice Ste224. While the adequacy of the state forum has always been important when

considering Younger abstention, to claim that it is the "only pertinent inquiry" in considering abstention discounts the interests of the petitioner, including the desire to exercise
federal rights and an interest in seeking remedies unavailable in state courts. Id.; see
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
225. 442 U.S. at 430 (citations omitted). This is simply incorrect. The inadequacy of
state court adjudication of federal rights was recognized in Monroe v. Pape. See discussion
supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text. More importantly, Congress has accepted the
notion that state courts do not adequately protect federal rights. Congress incorporated
this determination in legislation with respect to the jurisdiction of federal courts when it
enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1343. See supra part L.A. Whether or not the courts have made such a
determination is moot; Congress has acted within its legislative power to open the federal
court doors to civil rights cases. Rehnquist's "Our Federalism" attempts to deny Congress
its rightful choice on this subject, substituting an amorphous doctrine of Younger abstention for the will of Congress. For a discussion of the inadequacy of state court adjudication
of federal rights, see supra part I.C..
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vens pointed out in dissent, the decision deprived the federal petitioners the federal forum to which they were entitled.226
5. The Further Removal of Abstention Restrictions:Abstention
in Favor of a Nonexistent State Suit. The right to initiate claims in
federal courts was limited again by Rehnquist in the 1981 decision
in Parratt v. Taylor.22 7 Parratt was not decided on abstention
grounds, but is an important case in a study of the development of
Rehnquist's jurisprudence of limiting civil rights litigants access to
federal court. The case involved a state prisoner's challenge against
prison officials for unlawful deprivation of property.2 28 Taylor had
ordered through the mail and paid for a hobby kit which, because of
mishandling by prison officials, he never received. 22 9 After unsuccessfully pursuing the matter through the prison's grievance procedure, 2 0 Taylor brought this action under § 1983, alleging deprivation of property without due process of law.3 1 While the Court acknowledged that negligent deprivation of property constituted a
claim under § 1983,2 Rehnquist held that Taylor had failed to
properly allege a violation of the due process clause, and therefore,
was not entitled to relief. s3 The Court concluded that Taylor was required to initiate an action in state court under state law in order to
226. 442 U.S. at 435 (Stevens, J., dissenting). As Stevens explained:

Younger abstention in these circumstances does not merely deprive the plaintiffs of their right to initiate new claims in the forum of their choice, Far more
seriously, it deprives them of any relief at all. For this state forum could not and
did not afford plaintiffs the sufficient opportunity to vindicate their constitutional rights that is not only a predicate to a Younger dismissal, but also their
entitlement under the Constitution.
Id. at 440-41.

227. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
228. Id. at 529.
229. Id. at 529-30.
230. Id. at 556 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The majority, for whatever reasons, did not include this piece of information in its discussion of the
events leading up to the suit.
231. Id. at 530.
232. Id. at 535-37. The Court engaged in a discussion of the constitutionality of postdeprivation remedies. While acknowledging the Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972),
line of cases requiring pre-deprivation hearings, Rehnquist cited eight cases which purported to show that post-deprivation remedies could be considered adequate when "quick
action" was required, or a meaningful hearing was impractical. Id. at 538-39 (citations
omitted). Of those eight, five required quick action so as to avoid financial crisis or food
emergency. One of the cases involved a challenge to a World War II emergency measure.
One has been questioned as to its continuing validity in subsequent Supreme Court cases.
One was a memorandum decision. The most recent case was from 1950, and five of the
cases were from 1930 or earlier. Id.
233. Id. at 543.
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redress the deprivation. 4 Absent an attempt at vindicating his
rights in state court, a plaintiff could not allege a violation of due
process rights. 5 A plaintiff could be required to proceed under a
state cause of action despite the fact that certain remedies may be
different or even wholly unavailable in the state forum.2 6 The Court
did not abstain in this case. Instead, the Court forced a federal petitioner to initiate an action in state court on the grounds that due
process is not violated if the party alleging injury has not attempted
to utilize all of the state remedies available for redress of that injury.237 This holding violates two of the most important tenets of access to federal courts in civil rights matters. First, it vitiates the
principle that the existence of a state remedy will not bar a jurisdictionally sound suit from being brought in federal court.2 38 Second, it
eviscerates the "no exhaustion" rule of Patsy v. Board of Regents,
announced one year later, 9 by requiring the plaintiff to initiate
a
2 40
state court proceeding, which, once begun, is subject to exhaustion.
One can easily see the relevance of the Parrattdecision to abstention doctrine. While not abstention, Parrattcontinues the type of
analysis that has marked the development of civil rights abstention.
Rehnquist invokes Supreme Court jurisdictional policy to defeat
what would otherwise be a proper federal claim. He illustrates the
point with surprising candor:
In the best of all possible worlds, the District Court's... statement
that respondents loss should not go without redress would be an admirable provision to be contained in a code which governed the administration
of justice in a civil-law jurisdiction. For better or for worse, however, our
traditions arise from the common law of case-by-case reasoning and the

234. Id. at 544.
235. Id. It is not clear as to whether Parrattapplies to all deprivations, including life
and liberty, or just to deprivations of property. See id. at 545 (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(arguing that Parrattdoes not apply in situations involving life or liberty).
236. Id. at 543-44. In the instant case, the punitive damages that the plaintiff was
seeking in federal court were not available in the state forum. Id. at 544.
237. The majority recognized that this kind of injury could be redressed under
§ 1983. Id. The Court simply determined that if you don't try in the first instance to utilize state remedies, you can't challenge them later. Id. at 543-44.
238. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled on other grounds by Monell v.
Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Writing for the majority in Monroe,
Justice Douglas stated: "It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would
give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need
not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked." Id. at 183. Oddly,
Rehnquist himself quoted this language only months later in Fair Assessment in Real
Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 104 (1981). See discussion of FairAssessment infra
notes 246-74 and accompanying text.
239. 457 U.S. 496 (1982); see supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
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establishment of precedent. 241

While the United States may not constitute a "civil-law jurisdiction," there is, in fact, a provision in a code which governs the
administration of justice in federal civil law. It is the United States
Code, Volume 28, § 1343, and it was promulgated in accordance with
Congress' Article H power under the United States Constitution. 2 42
As Part I of this Comment has pointed out, § 1343 was meant to
guarantee access to federal courts in civil rights cases.2 3 It was enacted in order to change the traditional relationships between state
and federal courts.2 Rehnquist's attempt to frame the resolution of
all jurisdictional matters as turning on common law is misplaced.
While Congress has undoubtedly left the courts to make many of
their own policy decisions, where Congress has enacted law on the
subject of jurisdiction, judicial discretion is to be subordinated to the
legislative will. 4 5 The Court's, and more specifically Rehnquist's,
penchant for deciding jurisdictional questions on the basis of precedent is the reason that a doctrine like civil rights abstention or even
Younger abstention can exist and be exercised despite laws to the
contrary. Rehnquist's statement above at best reflects misjudgment
as to the resolution of jurisdictional questions, and at worst, indicates an unjustified transgression of authority in violation of the
Constitution.

IV. THE CULMINATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS ABSTENTION DEVELOPMENT:
FAIR ASSESSMENT IN REAL ESTATE ASSOCIATION V. MCNARY

Nowhere is Rehnquist's predilection for resolving jurisdictional
questions in accordance with "tradition" rather than statutory law
more evident than in the case of FairAssessment in Real Estate Association v. McNary.2" Fair Assessment is a watershed opinion on
241. 451 U.S. at 531.
242. Article III, § 2 of the United States' Constitution provides in relevant part that
"the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such
Exceptions, and under such Regulations as Congress shall make." U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 2, cl. 2.
243. See discussion infra part I.A.
244. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 240 (1972).
245. It is a fundamental constitutional concept that the judicial authority of the
United States courts is derived from the federal constitution and laws made thereunder.
See Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 77 (1987) ("The power of federal courts to hear and
decide cases is defined by Article III of the Constitution and by the federal statutes
enacted thereunder."). Under the Constitution, Congress retains the power of
determining how judicial authority will be allocated, and the courts are not free to
disregard or evade the limits Congress places on federal court jurisdiction. Owen Equip.
& Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441,
449 (1850).
246. 454 U.S. 100 (1981).

1994]

CiIL RIGHTS ABSTENTION

545

the subject of abstention, employing almost every major development in the doctrine since the Younger decision almost 10 years
earlier. FairAssessment also extended abstention to cases contemplating damages as opposed to simply declaratory or injunctive relief. The case involved a § 1983 challenge to a local government's
system of property tax evaluations, which according to the plaintiffs,
resulted in unequally assessed properties in violation of the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.247 The association of local taxpayers objected to the tax assessor's practice of taxing new or newly renovated properties at higher
rates than older properties. 48 Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged
that those taxpayers who had successfully challenged previous assessments were targeted for reassessment in the following year at a
higher rate. 249 The lower courts had found that the Tax Injunction
Act barred the federal court from hearing the suit, 250 a position
251
adopted by the four concurring justices in FairAssessment. Rehn247. Id. at 106.
248. Id.
249. Id. Compare the facts in FairAssessment to those of Wooley v. Maynard, 430
U.S. 705 (1977). In Wooley, a Jehovah's Witness brought a federal action for injunctive
relief against enforcement of a state law which made it a criminal offense to obscure any
letter or number of a state automobile license plate. Maynard had been repeatedly arrested for covering the motto "Live Free or Die" which appeared on the plates, and had
served 15 days in jail and paid numerous small fines. Maynard objected to the motto on
religious grounds, and brought the federal action at a time when no state action was
pending. 430 U.S. at 707-08. The Supreme Court declined to abstain, citing that the numerous prosecutions when combined with the threat of future prosecution constituted an
exceptional circumstance capable of overcoming federalism objections. Id. at 712. Although taxpayers in FairAssessment were subject to repeated property tax increases, the
Court dismissed the suit. 454 U.S. at 105-07. Is the Court affording greater deference to
administrative actions such as tax collections than it is to state judicial proceedings? The
argument in FairAssessment that the relief contemplated would unduly interfere with
state action was not persuasive in Wooley. Does the Court display more deference to civil
matters such as tax actions than to criminal proceedings? The Court in FairAssessment
abstained on grounds that the plaintiffs should have pursued state civil remedies. The
Wooley Court, however, declined to abstain even though Maynard had refused to raise his
federal rights or exhaust his state appellate remedies.
Why did the Court abstain in FairAssessment and not Wooley? Perhaps the Wooley
Court was more sympathetic to the merits of that case and felt they should be reached.
Perhaps the fact that Maynard was subject to repeated fines and confinement altered the
analysis, whereas the plaintiffs in FairAssessment were not subject to such egregious
measures. In any event, the discrepancy indicates the uncertainty of result that has
marked the "continuous refashioning of 'Our Federalism." WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 4,
§ 4255, at 266.
250. 454 U.S. at 102. The Tax Injunction Act provides that "[tihe district courts shall
not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State
law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State."
28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988).
251. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Stevens and O'Connor, concurred
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quist's majority, however, specifically declined to decide the case on
the basis of that act, preferring instead to hold that the principle of
comity barred a federal court from granting relief in this instance. 212
Because the Tax Injunction Act, Rehnquist wrote, "reflect[s] the
fundamental principle of comity between federal courts and state
governments that is essential to 'Our Federalism,' 2 the case could
be decided on those considerations alone. This marked the first time
that Rehnquist acknowledged legislative history in an opinion
dealing with abstention. 54 Significantly though, the history discussed was not that of § 1343, but of § 1341, the Tax Injunction
Act.25 While Rehnquist was prepared to accept legislative history as
supporting his notion of "Our Federalism," he apparently was not,
and has not been, able to acknowledge the entire body of legislative
history and statutory language to the contrary.
FairAssessment is important for more than just Rehnquist's
treatment of legislative history. The opinion embodies every major
post-Younger development in the use of federalism and comity to
justify federal court abstention. Applying the dicta from Rizzo v.
Goode256 and Gibson v. Berryhil1257 that federal courts should defer
not only to state courts, but to other state judicial proceedings as
well,2 58 the Court held that because the federal action would have
interfered with the state function of collecting taxes, federal courts
should not have intervened.25 Relying on Huffman,260 Juidice,26 ' and
2 62 the
Trainor,
Court was able to apply abstention to a civil case.263
The Hicks-Doran holdings that abstention may apply even where

in the judgment in FairAssessment.454 U.S. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring).

252. Id. at 105, 107, 116.
253. Id.at 103.
254. The legislative history of § 1343 was not discussed in Parratt v. Taylor, 451
U.S. 527 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986);
Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977); Doran v. Salem
Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975); or Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
255. Rather than cite directly to the legislative history of either § 1343 or § 1983,
Rehnquist cited the Monroe line of cases as construing § 1983 to authorize immediate access to federal court for plaintiffs alleging a violation of constitutional rights. 454 U.S. at
104.
256. 423 U.S. 362, 380 (1976).
257. 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973).
258. 454 U.S. at 112-13.
259. Id. at 113-14. Although a federal suit might interfere with tax collection, it is
not clear how a state action would be less disruptive. A finding of unconstitutionality in
either state or federal court would affect tax collection equally.
260. Huffinan v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975).
261. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335 (1977).
262. Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 439 (1977).
263. 454 U.S. at 112.
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there is no pending state proceeding" allowed the Court to justify
abstention in a situation where there was no state action filed by
any party at any time.2" Finally, the Court incorporated its holding
in Parrattv. Taylor 6 6 to find that federal plaintiffs can be required
to pursue state remedies to redress injuries, which except for the
application of federalism, could be vindicated in federal courts. 7
In addition to incorporating the holdings from previous abstention cases, Rehnquist extended the doctrine to apply to federal damages actions, in addition to actions seeking injunctions (proscribed
by Younger) or declaratory relief (proscribed by Samuels). Rehnquist
reasoned that any damages recovered by the plaintiffs in the instant
case would have required a finding that the local assessment scheme
was unconstitutional, which in turn would interfere or end that
system of collecting taxes.2 6 Thus, the same considerations of comity
and deference which militate against injunctions and declaratory
relief applied here, where the interference resulting from a finding
of unconstitutionality would upset state functions in the same way
that the other types of relief would.2 69 The effect of the decision is to
deny a civil rights plaintiff access to court if he is seeking any of
three remedies: an injunction, declaratory relief, or an award of
damages.
There are some interesting comparisons that may be drawn
between FairAssessment and the Younger decision, which was rendered almost ten years earlier. In Younger, the Court had two options on which it could have based its decision: equity or federalism.
Justice Black chose to rely on an equity analysis to hold that ab7 In FairAssessment, the Court also had
stention was warranted.Y
two options: the Tax Injunction Act or comity and federalism. Rehnquist opted for comity and federalism, rather than the statute which
explicitly barred that type of action. In Younger, "Our Federalism"
was used to buttress an opinion based on the recognized policy of
equitable restraint. In FairAssessment, however, federalism became
264. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S.
922, 925 (1975).
265. 454 U.S. at 112-13.
266. 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams,
474 U.S. 327 (1986).

267. 454 U.S. at 116.
268. Id. at 115. This conclusion, however, is not certain. As Professor Braveman
points out, the FairAssessment plaintiffs sought damages from the individual officials,
and not from the state. Furthermore, the plaintiffs would have been required to prove bad
faith on the part of those officials, meaning that a judgment against those defendants
would not implicate the state's scheme for collecting taxes, or any state funds. Braveman,

supra note 13, at 359.
269. 454 U.S. at 115-16.
270. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 56 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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the primary tenet on which the Court based its decision, outweighing even an available statutory proscription on hearing such a case.
Even though these two cases utilized federalism in differing degrees,
the two opinions do show a willingness on the part of the Court to
decide jurisdictional issues in accordance with its own judicially
2 1
created policies, and without regard to congressional mandates. 1
Another comparison lies in the Court's treatment of permissible
and impermissible "chilling effects" that resulted from the decision
in each case. In Younger, the Court concluded that a "chilling effect"
on First Amendment rights by a state would not in and of itself justify federal intervention in state matters. 2 In Fair Assessment,
however, Rehnquist found that the "chilling effect" on state activity
that would result from an adverse federal ruling in the case could
not be permitted, as it would effectively prevent local officials from
doing their jobs, and consequently suspend the entire state function
under attack in federal court. 3 So while the Court is willing to allow states, acting in the course of regulating speech, to inhibit the
exercise of First Amendment rights,274 action by citizens that would
inhibit the carrying on of state functions will not receive the same
protection.
In terms of civil rights abstention, Rehnquist has used the Fair
Assessment decision to expand the scope of federalism to require
abstention where a civil rights plaintiff is seeking damages as opposed to injunctive or declaratory relief. The decision removes the
Younger-Samuals limitation on abstention doctrine which limited
abstention to cases involving declaratory or injunctive relief. And
while Rehnquist finally recognized the existence of § 1343, and case
law supporting the right of access to federal court, he still refused to
allow the petitioners to exercise that Congressionally authorized
right.

V. FINE TUNING CIVIL RIGHTS ABSTENTION DOcTRINE:
FINDING MORE WAYS TO ABSTAIN

A.

Abstention in Favorof State Administrative Proceedings

Since the FairAssessment decision, the Court has continued to
defer to what has become a growing body of "compelling" state interests other than criminal and quasi-criminal enforcement actions. In
271. In his concurrence, Justice Stewart pointed out that the Younger Court's
holding was based on policy grounds and declined to consider the applicability of the AntiInjunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1988), with respect to the facts of the case. Id. (Stewart,
J., concurring).
272. Id. at 50.
273. 454 U.S. at 115.
274. 401 U.S. at 51 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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Middlesex Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Association,2 75
Justice White, writing for the Court, found that abstention applied
in the case of a federal constitutional challenge to state disciplinary
proceedings where federal issues could be raised in the state forum.27 6 The Court set forth a three-part test to evaluate whether or
not abstention was justified under the facts. First, it was necessary
to determine if the disciplinary proceedings constituted an "ongoing
state judicial proceeding."2 77 Second, the Court considered the question of whether or not the proceedings implicated important state
interests.278 Third, the Court determined whether or not the state forum provided an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional
claims.2 79 The Court concluded that the disciplinary proceedings did
constitute an ongoing state proceeding, that the state did have a
substantial interest in trying the case, and that the state forum was
adequate for purposes of hearing federal claims.28 In evaluating the
state's interest, the Court found that the objective of "purification of
the bar" had significant ramifications in protecting both the public
and the integrity of the profession. 28' The Court, however, continued
by saying that the fact that a state agency was named as a defendant in the case demonstrated the state's interest in resolving the
issue in its own state courts.8 2 It is not clear whether or not the
Court intended to make the standard for a valid state interest turn
on the mere happenstance that the state has been named in a suit.
Whatever the Court's intention, the decision renewed the state's interest analysis originally employed in Huffman. The Court stated:
"The importance of the state interest in the pending state judicial
proceedings and in the federal case calls Younger abstention into
play."283 Younger however never anticipated a balancing of interests.
Younger abstention was based on equity jurisprudence which counseled deference to state courts in certain cases. The exceptions to
abstention discussed in that case were not the result of any diminished state interest in the case, but would occur when there was a
recognizable defect in the forum, or the state procedure. The impor275. 457 U.S. 423 (1982).

276. Id. at 435. The case involved an attorney who had been charged with violating
two provisions of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. Rather than defending
against the charges in the local disciplinary proceedings, the attorney filed an action in
federal court challenging the constitutionality of the rules under which he was being tried
as violative of the First Amendment. Id. at 429.
277. Id. at 432.

278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 434.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 435.
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tance of the state's interest doesn't call Younger into play, it calls the
doctrine of civil rights abstention into play.
Middlesex invokes "Our Federalism" to justify the application of
abstention to administrative proceedings which are civil in nature,
and are not akin to criminal trials. The Court transforms the
Younger doctrine from one based on equity to one based on the interest of a state in pursuing particular interests in its own forums.
While Middlesex does not involve a § 1983 challenge, it does involve
an attempt, thwarted by the Supreme Court, to vindicate a constitutional right in a federal forum.
Relmquist's most recent opinion on the abstention doctrine
came in Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian
Schools.28 The case involved a federal action by the Dayton Christian Schools to enjoin a state administrative action against the private school district. The Dayton Board of Directors had fired Linda
Hoskinson for not following the "biblical chain of command" in resolving a dispute with the school." 5 Hoskinson complained to the
Ohio Civil Rights Commission, which after numerous attempts at
persuading Dayton to settle the dispute, brought administrative
proceedings against the school for the purpose of determining if, in
fact, Dayton had violated Ohio's anti-discrimination law. 28 6 Dayton,
in turn, filed the federal action, alleging that the imposition of sanctions against the school would violate the religion clauses of the
First Amendment of the Constitution." 7 Though the lower courts did
not reach the abstention issue, Rehnquist found "that the District
Court should have abstained from adjudicating this case under
Younger v. Harrisand later cases."288 He then embarked on a capsule summary of the development of abstention from the Younger
decision to Huffman, Gibson, Middlesex, and others 289 to support the
284. 477 U.S. 619 (1986).
285. Id. at 623. Hoskinson was challenging the school's decision not to renew her
contract on grounds that she had become pregnant and that school policy dictated that
mothers should stay home with their children. Hoskinson had hired an attorney to assist
her. In response to Hoskinson's actions, the school abandoned the claim, but dismissed
her instead for not following the school's grievance procedure which was based on the
biblical interpretation that one Christian should never take another Christian into court. Id&
286. Id. at 623-24.
287. Id. at 624-25.
288. Id. at 625 (citation and footnote omitted). It was necessary for Rehnquist to add
the words "and later cases" as the decision in Dayton turned on the precedents set by the
civil rights abstention cases which followed Younger, rather than Younger itself.
289. Rehnquist cited to Huffman, Juidice, Trainor, and Moore for the proposition
that Younger abstention was applicable to civil proceedings; Gibson for the proposition
that certain administrative proceedings were to be treated as judicial proceedings for abstention purposes; and Middlesex to stand for the notion that administrative proceedings
within the appellate jurisdiction of a state court are subject to abstention. Id. at 626-27
(citations omitted).
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conclusion that abstention could apply to an administrative agency
conducting an investigation to determine if state law had been violated. 29 Because the agency allowed parties to raise constitutional
claims, Dayton could be forced to adjudicate them in the administrative hearings, rather than attempt to vindicate their constitutional claims in the federal forum of their choice. However, Rehnquist went further, adding that even if the commission did not have
the authority to hear constitutional claims, the agency had the discretion to "construe its own statutory mandate in the light of federal
constitutional principles."291 According to Rehnquist's opinion, even
if the state forum is not adequate to hear federal claims, a federal
petitioner may still be required to bring constitutional claims to that
inadequate forum, and allow the state agency the opportunity to
determine for itself how it may construe its duty in light of federal
constitutional principles. An agency that purports to follow federal
constitutional provisions may hear such issues even if its own state
law has declined to give the agency such authority. Furthermore,
because of the Middlesex decision, even if the agency may not hear
constitutional claims, the fact that they may be brought in a subsequent judicial proceeding will satisfy the requirement of an adequate state forum. 292
The new element to civil rights abstention added by Dayton is
the idea that an administrative proceeding may be considered to be
adequate for abstention purposes provided that the agency running
the proceeding construes its state statutory mandate in light of the
Federal Constitution. There is no precedent for this idea in the
Younger-Huffman line of cases. Further, the basis of this position is
not clear from the opinion. The explanation appears to lie in the result: state agencies will have more autonomy, and will be less likely
to be subject to federal intervention. In short, the concerns of federalism counselling deference to state courts also counsel deference
to state administrative proceedings, and go further by allowing state
agents to define the scope of those proceedings so as to avoid federal
intervention. As with all of the civil rights abstention cases, Dayton
serves to keep civil rights litigants out of federal court, and unable
to exercise § 1343 privileges.
B.

Abstention When PrivatePartiesImplicate State Interests

The most recent opinion in the development of civil rights abstention was written by Justice Powell, in which Rehnquist joined.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 629 (citing Middlesex Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S.
423, 436 (1982)).
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In Pennzoil, Co. v. Texaco, Inc.,293 the Court ruled that Younger abstention was applicable to cases in which the state was not a party.
Pennzoil involved Texaco's challenge to the application of a Texas
law requiring a judgment debtor to post a bond in the amount of the
judgment in order to suspend execution of that judgment pending
appeal.294 Texaco brought suit in federal court claiming that because
enforcement of the judgment would fall to state officials, the state
law that required, without exception, the posting of a bond constituted a denial under color of law of Texaco's right to appeal the
judgment in state court. 295 The lower courts refused to abstain under
Younger, noting that the state's interest in this litigation differed
from those cases where the Supreme Court had found abstention to
be applicable. 29 6 The Supreme Court, however, held that the
"principles of federalism enunciated in Younger v. Harris" warranted abstention.2 97 Justice Powell found that the "importance to
the States of enforcing the orders and judgments of their courts" was
similar to interests in Juidice, in adjudicating contempt proceedings,
and therefore, that interest was subject to federal deference. 2 8 The
Court came to this conclusion despite the fact that the State of
Texas had expressly represented to the Court of Appeals that it
"'ha[d] no interest in the outcome of the state-court adjudication underlying this cause,' except in its fair adjudication." 299 The Court
however managed to impute a compelling state interest that would
counsel the propriety of an abstention decision in a suit involving
two private parties. Compare this rule with that of Younger, on
which the Court purported to base its decision. Younger relied on
equity; the state's interest was not considered independently, but in
the context of traditional equity jurisprudence. It was not the interest that counseled abstention, but the existence of a body of law
which supported a tradition of non-interference in such cases. 3 0 The
creation and development of the state's interest test in the cases
following Huffman distinguish civil rights abstention from Younger
abstention. Pennzoil's contribution to the doctrine of civil rights ab293. 481 U.S. 1 (1987).

294. Id. at 5. Because of the substantial amount of the judgment award, the required bond would have amounted to over 13 billion dollars. Id.
295. Id. at 8-9. The district court determined that the application of the bond provision combined with a Texas lien provision would effectively deny Texaco the right to appeal. Id. at 7.
296. Id. at 9.
297. Id. at 10.
298. Id. at 13.
299. Id. at 19 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Brief of the State of Texas, Intervenor-Appellant at 2, Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986) (Nos. 867046, 86-7052)).
300. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971).
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stention is the notion that abstention may be appropriate even when
a state is not party to an action. The abstention decision forces the
federal petitioner to litigate federal claims in state court, despite
§ 1343's guarantee of access.
CONCLUSION

Through his opinions, Chief Justice Rehnquist has expanded
the applicability of federalism and comity as defined in Younger to
create a new doctrine of civil rights abstention that is distinct from
the Younger doctrine. Despite the continued characterization of federal deference to state courts as being based on Younger, these cases
are actually applying civil rights abstention which differs from
Younger in three ways. First, civil rights abstention is based solely
on federalism and comity, whereas Younger was based on equity,
and only reinforced by "Our Federalism." Second, civil rights abstention is not limited by the conditions of Younger, such as a
pending state criminal suit. Civil rights abstention applies to civil
actions, actions brought subsequent to the filing of the federal action, administrative actions, and even when there is no state action
planned by any party to the suit. Finally, civil rights abstention denies the Congressionally guaranteed right of access to federal court
as codified in § 1983 and § 1343 of the United States Code. These
provisions were intended to guarantee access to federal courts in
civil rights cases. Civil rights abstention doctrine violates those
provisions by denying petitioners the ability to utilize that guarantee. Rather than just an exercise in semantics, the purpose of this
Comment is to change the focus of abstention analysis from how the
Court's decisions have violated Younger, to how the opinions have
violated this country's guarantee of access to federal courts. Courts,
after all, are not charged with upholding Younger; they are, however, charged with upholding the law.

